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THE FUNCTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
REQUIRING UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION*
By WILLIA-M L. MATTHEWS, JR.**
CHAPTER VI




One of the best indications available as to the significance of the
labeling technique in resolving problems of uniformity is the extent
to which the courts have their attention directed to the idea that all
taxes are in reality taxes on property Nearly every type of tax legisla-
tion imaginative legislatures can produce is contested on the theory
that it is subject to the constitutional restriction of uniformity gen-
erallv applicable to property taxation. The argument meets with
little success where few, if any, of the characteristics of the general
property tax are present. Thus poll or capitation taxes were seldom
attacked historically on this basis, and the authorities are unanimous
about the nature of inheritance taxes. Usually excise, occupation,
privilege, license, sales, use, and other similar taxes are sustained as
non-property in character, but, where the object and method of the
legislation is not absolutely clear, they may be held unconstitutional.
One of the chief weaknesses of such categorical conceptualism in
tax cases is the fact that it gives little recognition to the existence of
a normal middle-ground where a statute combines characteristics
familiar to both property and non-property taxation. Quite often a
tax does not have the simplicity of method or object which will permit
placing it in one category or the other. It has been said that "whether
* This is the third of four articles based on a thesis written in partial fulfillment
of requirements for the S. J. D. degree at the University of Michigan Law School.
The first two installments appeared in the November and January issues of the
journal and the last will appear in the May issue.
** A. B. Western Kentucky State College; LL. B. University of Kentucky;
LL. M. Iniversity of Michigan. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, Lex-
ington.
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or not a given tax is an excise, or a privilege and occupational, or a
property tax, is ordinarily not difficult of solution,";- but it is doubtful
if many courts would subscribe to this sentiment, especially where a
statute includes features of both types in a single tax. When pointing
to distinctions in a general way the courts advance at least two tests.
The one most frequently agreed upon emphasizes the method of lay-
ing the tax. The Supreme Court gave it early expression in Society for
Savings v Coite, by saying. 16 3
"An excise and a property tax, when the two approach
each other, ordinarily may be distinguished by the respective methods
adopted of laying them and fixing their amounts. If the tax is nn-
posed directly by the legislature without assessment, and its sum is
measured by the amount of business done or the extent to wuch the
conferred pnvileges have been enjoyed or exercised by the taxpayer,
irrespective of the nature or value of the taxpayer s assets, it is re-
garded as an excise; but if the tax is computed upon a valuation of
property, and assessed by assessors either where it is situated or at the
owner s domicile, although pnvileges may be included in the valua-
tion, it is considered a property tax."
If property normally is taxed according to value tius general test
is varied somewhat to stress a feature consistent with the language of
the state's constitution as in Pacific Gas and Electric Company v
Roberts,164 where the California court stated:
"The essential difference between an ad valorem tax
and any form of privilege tax is that the ad valorem tax is based upon
the value of the property, tangible or intangible. The pivilege tax
need not be based upon such value at all."
The second test makes the object or purpose of the tax determinative
as illustrated by the explanation in Reif v Barrett, an Illinois case, to
the effect: 165
"Their character and their object are vastly different. A
property tax is levied merely for the purpose of raising revenue, and
is levied against property. It does not seek or in any wise attempt to
control the use, operation, or regulation of the property. When the
tax is raised, the mission of the property tax has been fulfilled. A
property tax has nothing whatever to do with the question of pn-
vilege, license, or permission. On the other hand, an occupa-
tion tax may be levied under the general police powers of the state,
where its purpose is to regulate or control a given occupation, or it
may be levied under the general sovereign powers of the state where
its sole purpose is to raise revenue. Under which power it is levied
makes no difference as to the character of the tax."
There is a third test based on an economic rather than a purely legal
'1-2Reif v. Barrett, 355 I1. 104, 188 N. E. 889 (1918).
6 Wall. 594 (U. S. 1868).
164 168 Cal. 420, 143 Pac. 700 (1914).
Reif v. Barrett, supra note 162 at 109, 188 N. E. at 892.
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view which relies on the so-called incidence of the tax, but it is not
in general use. The Arizona court applied it in upholding a license
tax by saving:1-'
"Taxes are classified as poll, property and excise. The
meaning of the first two is obvious. Excise has come to include
every form of taxation which is not a burden laid directly on persons
or property "
Whether the test is one of method or object its application to those
taxes which fall in the shadows between categories is most difficult,
and it is precisely here that the functions and effect of the uniformity
provision is most apparent.
SECTION 2
Franchise Taxes
Franchise taxes seem to have gven the courts as much trouble as
any other. In addition to the general conflict as to whether a cor-
porate franchise is or is not property within the purview of the general
tax law 1,7 there is considerable confuson on the nature of taxes levied
against the corporation directly If the tax is called a franchise tax
levied because of the corporation s right to exist and right to do busi-
ness within the state, it is in a legal sense a sort of privilege tax and not
subject to the strict rule of uniformity But, since the tax usually is
measured by the value of corporate property, it is possible to find that
it is just another property tax to be paid by the corporation. The tax
most often levied is an ad valorem tax on the capital stock or other
property
The privilege theory is clearly illustrated in Kaiser Land and Fruit
Company v Curry,s where a statute provided that all corporations
engaged in business should pay an annual tax proportionate to the
amount of the authorized capital stock of the corporation. The court
not only found the tax was a charge for the privilege of existing as a
corporation, but held that assessment of the franchise as property
within the meaning of the constitution in no way prevented the state
from levying this additional tax as a privilege. Similarly, an annual
franchise tax of five cents on each one hundred dollars of capital stock
represented by business transacted, and property located in, the state
is not a property tax, because the value of the corporate assets in no
way measures the amount of the tax inasmuch as the capital may be
Gila Mcat Company v. State, 35 Ariz. 19-4, 276 Pac. 1 (1929).
Blackrock Copper Mining and Milling Company v. Thgey, 34 Utah 369, 98
P'ac. 180 (1922).
"' 155 Cal. 638, 103 Pac. 3-11 (1909).
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increased by surplus profits without increasing the amount of the
capital stock. 1 9 On the privilege basis it is possible to levy at a dif-
ferent rate on preferred stock of foreign corporations and common
stock of domestic corporations without violating uniformity, 7 0 and
the theory may even be broad enough to sustain a fixed rate based on
such proportion of the outstanding capital stock, surplus, undivided
profits, and bonds not maturing within one year as the gross receipts
derived from business done in the state bears to the total from the
corporation's entire business.17 1 In short, a tax graduated by the
amount of capital stock of a corporation, either authorized or outstand-
ing, the capital stock represented by property owned and used in
business in the state, is usually regarded as a franchise tax imposed on
the privilege of corporate existence or right to do business and there-
fore valid.172
When there is interjected into the legislation some method of re-
turn comparable to a property tax valuation, however, the result is
entirely different. For instance, a statute levying a tax upon the
"capital stock of all corporations" which requires the chief officer of
the corporation to make a return of all the taxable property of the
corporation, in which he must state the market value of the capital
stock, the items of property in which it is invested, as well as the num-
ber of shares into which it is divided with the par value and actual
value of each, was held to impose a property levy rather than a fran-
chise tax.173  The court said: 17
4
"Owing to the difficulty of distinguishing between the
capital and the property in which it is invested, tests for deterrmng
whether a tax is on the franchise or on the property may be regarded
generally as uncertain and unsatisfactory; yet the determination is
"'People ex rel Roberts and Son v. Emerson, 305 Ill. 348, 147 N. E. 202 (1922).
1"0 United North and South Development Company v. Heath, 78 S. W 2d 650
(Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
I'l Airway Electric Appliance Corporation v. Archer, 279 Fed. 878 (1922).
1 2 Kansas City Railroad Company v. Botken, 240 U. S. 227 (1916); Lusk v.
Botkin, 240 U. S. 236 (1916); Southern Railroad Company v. Green, 160 Ala. 396,
49 So. 404 (1908); St. Louis Railroad Company v. State, 106 Ark. 321, 152 S. W. 110
(1913): Kaiser Land and Fruit Company v. Curry, 155 Cal. 638, 103 Pac. 341 (1909);
American Smelting and Refining Company v. People, 34 Colo. 240, 82 Pac. 531
(1905); Coite v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, 36 Conn. 512 (1870);
Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Gifford, 25 Idaho 196, 136 Pac. 1131 (1913):
People ex rel Roberts and Company v. Emerson, 305 Ill. 358, 137 N. E. 202 (1922);
Green v. Centria Corporation, 175 Kv. 661, 194 S. AV 820 (1917); S. S. White Dental
Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth, 212 Mass. 35, 98 N. E. 1056 (1912):
Union Steam Pump Sales Company v. DeLand, 216 Mich. 261, 185 N. W. 353 (1921);
State v. Pierce Petroleum Company, 318 Mo. 1020, 2 S. W 2d 790 (1928); Montana
Electric Company v. Anderson, 49 Mont. 29, 140 Pac. 82 (1914); State ex rel Beatrice
Creamery Company v. Marsh, 119 Neb. 197, 227 N. XV. 926 (1929); Hancock v.
Singer Sewing Machine Company, 62 N. J. L. 298, 41 At. 846 (1898).
1-' State v. Stonewall Insurance Company, 89 Ala. 335, 7 So. 753 (1889).
4' 1d. at 340, 7 So. at 754.
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often necessary. The usual and most certain test is whether
the taix is upon the capital stock, eo nomine, without regard to its
value or at its assessed valuation in whatever it may be invested;
if the former it is a franchise tax; if the latter a tax upon the
property."
Also, if the statute couples with such a return feature a provision that
the tax is in lieu of all other taxes it is not uniform, 175 unless the con-
stitution specifically authorizes the taxing of corporatons according
to uniformity within the class. 17 '3 The reasoning in these cases seems
to be that such a statute merely represents a plan to reach more con-
vemently this class of property in the hands of the corporate owner.
However, even if it is settled that such a tax on capital stock is a
property tax, it by no means follows that every tax levied on capital
stock is necessarily a tax on property 177
The method test also may result in striking down statutes which
make exemptions other than the all inclusive one just mentioned. In
Kentucky for instance, a so-called franchise tax on all public utility
corporations requiring them to make a return to the state auditor of
the total value of the corporation's property, from which the value of
all tangible property held in the state was to be deducted was held
to be in fact a property tax upon all the intangible property of the
corporation; 7H and a corporate excess tax computed by subtracting
from the value of the capital stock all real and personal property
otherwise subject to taxation is a property tax void for lack of uni-
formity because it taxes money in the bank which is exempt in the
hands of individuals. The language of the statute is of little conse-
quence under a strict application of the method test in such cases
because a statute requiring a railroad to pay a "fee" is still a property
tax,' - ' and a capital stock tax is not made an excise by the phrase:
"to be assessed a sum in the nature of an excise tax, or license."sO One
of the things about the method rule that has made it so appealing is its
versatility It is a facile test at best and can be used to tip the scales
either way One would think, for example, that a tax measured by the
value of specifically enumerated property of the corporation is a prop-
erty tax, but a strikingly different result is reached in State v Western
I- Georgia State Building and Loan Association v. Savannah, 109 Ga. 63, 35
. E. 67 (1900).
I" Starling Ga- Company v. Higby, 135 Ill. 557. 25 N. E. 660 (1890).
"7 Commonwealth v. Delaware Railroad Company, 165 Pa. 44, 30 At. 522 (1898).
17 Cheapeake and Ohio Railroad Company v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 552,
228 S. W 15 (1920); Greene v. National Surety Company, 186 Ky. 353, 217 S. V I17
01919)" Covington Gaslight Company v. Covington, 92 Ky. 321, 17 S. IV 808 (1891).
7 ittsburg. Cincinnati. and St. I.ois Railroad Company v. State, 49 Ohio St.
1,9. 0 N. E. 435 (1892).
"'Statc v. Canade Cattle Car Company, 85 Minn. -457 89 N. W 66 (1902).
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Unton Telegraph Company, 8 where a statute required every tele-
graph corporation doing business in the state to pay a tax of two and
one-half per cent on the value of any telegraph line owned within the
limits of the state including "all poles, wire, insulators, office furniture,
batteries, instruments, et cetera." The tax was in lieu of all other
taxes on any of the property or shares of the corporation. In sustaining
the tax the court said:'
182
"The method by which the burden is Imposed, though
not conclusive, has a significant bearing upon the meamng and pur-
pose of the act. It is not levied as property taxes usually are. There
is no given fund to be assessed in which the percentage is fixed by
valuation, but the percentage is fixed by law, leaving the amount to
be ascertained by the valuation. But what is more important is the
land of property selected for valuation. It is not all the property
which the company may have, but only such as is used in the tele-
graph business. It is the telegraph line, with a detailed statement
of such articles as constitute that line, or are necessary to its opera-
tion. No real estate is specified, no other property however con-
vement it might be, or however much the company might own or
may acquire, can be included in the valuation. This tax, then, is vir-
tually imposed upon that which stands for the capital stock, or
rather upon the use of the property and upon the use of that wich
in some degree represents the extent of its business. It is that which
is invested in the business and exclusively used for carrying it on,
and may fairly, be used as a test of the extent of the business for the
purpose of fixing the amount to be paid for that business. Further,
while it is the property used which is valued, it is only while it is in
use for tis business."
Here, the court combines a test of method with one of object or
purpose, particularly where attention is directed to the use of the
property, and where the value of the property is considered a valid
measure of the extent of business done and the franchise or privilege
enjoyed. But even on this basis it is hard to rationalize the Western
Union Case for other courts under similar circumstances are not able
to find a sufficient connection between value and extent of use to
counteract the importance of the method of levying the tax. Thus a
statute requiring companies owning railroad cars other than those
wich were the property of railroad companies to submit an annual
statement showing the aggregate number of miles made by their cars
during the year, and the average number of miles traveled per day
by the cars of the particular class, and requiring the state board of
equalization to ascertain from such statement the number of cars
required to make the total mileage of the cars of the company, and to
collect a tax of two per cent in lieu of all other taxes is not an excise
or franchise tax, and violates the constitutional requirement of uni-
"s173 Me. 518 (1882).1 -21d. at 521.
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fortuity tI A similar result is reached where the tax is measured by
a flat rate per ton of copper and iron ore mined,18 4 and in the case of
a tax inposed on mining royalties.185
SECTION 3
Gross Recetpts Taxes
Possibly in an attempt to take advantage of the logic illustrated
by the Western Union Case that a tax measured by something which
reflects more directly than capital stock or corporate property the
value of the franchise, privilege or amount of business done, might not
be a property tax and therefore not unconstitutional, some statutes
call for the tax to be measured by gross receipts. Here, also, the gen-
eral position is that such a tax can be sustained as being non-property
in character,""' but the courts are far from complete agreement on the
point. The theory is that a tax measured by gross earnings is a tax
on the business which is performed and not a tax upon property in
any sense. In other words, a property tax based on the value of the
franchise and a business tax based on gross earnings are not identical
as to the subject of taxation18 7 A variation of tils ex-planation was
adopted by the Supreme Court in Flint v Stone Tracy Company,"8
when it found that a federal tax on the net income of insurance com-
panies over and above a certain sum received from all sources during
the year was not imposed upon the franchise, nor upon the property
of the corporation, but as an excise upon the doing of corporate or
insurance business. The authority of this case, however, opens the
"- State ex ,el Armour Packing Company v. Stephens, 146 Mo. 662, 48 S. W
929 (1898).
State v. Lakeside Land Company, '/1 Mini. 283, 73 N. W 970 (1898).
State ex rel Oliver Iron Mining Company v. Arnson, 181 )Vinn. 221, 232
N. W 35 (1930).
"Ohio River Company v. Ditty, 203 Fed. 437 (1913); Kentucky Southern
Building and Loan Association v. Norman, 98 Ky. 294, 32 S. AV 952 (1892); State
v. American Railway Express Company, 159 La. 1101, 106 So. 544 (1924); State v.
Bost Express Company, 100 Me. 278, 61 AtI. 697 (1905); State v. United States
Fidelity Company, 93 Md. 314, 48 At. 918 (1901); Massachusetts Bonding and
Insurance Company v. State Board of Taxes and Assessment, 97 N. J. L. 386, 117
Atd. 401 (1922): New York Life Insurance Company v. Bradley, 83 S. C. 418, 65
S. E. -133 (1909); Queen. City Fire Insurance Company v. Basford, 27 S. D. 164, 130
N. W. - (1911); State v. Galveston Railroad Company, 100 Tex. 153, 97 S. W 71
(1906).
""Lincoln Traction Company v. Lincoln, 84 Neb. 837 121 N. W 435 (1908);
Nebraska Telephone Company v. Lincoln. 82 Neb. 59, 117 N. W 284 (1905). In
this case the Nebraska Court went so far as to find that a tax on foreign insurance
companies providing that their gross receipts were "to be taken as an item of prop-
erty of that value to be assessed and taxed on the same percentage of such value
as other property- was not violative of the constitutional provision requiring the
taxation of property according to value because it was a business tax rather than a
property tax.
1220 U. S. 107 (1910).
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way to a controversy on the nature of net receipts as compared with
gross earnings, a point developed more fully in the income tax cases,
but applicable here since it may be found that a tax upon net receipts
of an insurance company is a tax on its personal property to be listed
by the board of assessors and taxed the same as other property I",
The line of reasoning that can be taken in making such distinctions
is well shown by a vigorous dissent in State ex rel Norwood v New
York Life Insurance Company.1'0 The statute in question imposed a
tax on the net receipts of every insurance company doing business
in the state and provided that "such tax shall be in lieu of all other
taxes." It was sustained by the court as an occupation tax on the con-
dition that the lieu clause be eliminated as violative of the uniformity
provision, but Wood, J., dissented on the ground that the tax was on
property and violative of the constitutional provision requiring taxation
according to value. He said:1""
"The act has all the earmarks of a property tax and none
of the distinguishing features of an occupation tax. If the legislature
had intended to impose an' excise tax, entirely different language
would have been employed. The language 'shall pay a tax on
net receipts shows a property tax was intended. 'Net Receipts are
property. Then the words such tax shall be in lieu of all other taxes
show conclusively to our mind that the legislature intended that the
tax imposed by the act was in lieu of all other property taxes.
It is conceded in the majority opinion that the clause violates un-
formuity and equality in taxation, and for that reason is void. This
demonstrates conclusively the correctness of iiy conclusion. For if
it were a privilege tax, it could not violate any provision of our con-
stitution because, as we have seen, there is no provision of our con-
stitution requinng equality and uniformity in occupation taxes."
The usual answer to this argument that receipts and earnings are
property is that they are not the subject of the tax, but merely repre-
sent the standard by means of which the amount of the tax is deter-
mined. As one court has said, "while it is true that the constitution
defines property as anything subject to ownership, and, in a sense,
one's business and its earnings are owned by him, the privilege of
engaging in business and gainful pursuit under the protection of our
laws is something far and away beyond and above the mere owner-
ship of a business. 0 2  It is on the strength of such distinctions as to
the real subject or object of a tax measured by gross receipts that many
of them have been sustained.
" People v. Cosmopolitan Fire Insurance Company, 246 111. 442, 92 N. E. 922(1910); Petroleum Navigation Company v. Henniforcl, 185 Wash, 495, 55 P 2d 1056
( 119 Ark. 322, 173 S. IV 1099 (1915).
- Id. at 326, 173 S. W at 1108.
11'Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 25 P 2d 91 (1933).
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To some extent the legal nature of a gross receipts tax is made
uncertain by a series of Supreme Court cases which describe it as a
property tax. 113 These cases hold that a state cannot burden interstate
commerce by taxing directly receipts derived from interstate business,
but because a gross receipts tax is m reality a tax on property measured
by receipts which come only in part from business of an interstate
character it is not open to attack as inconsistent with the Constitution.
In the absence of some distinguishing factor this interpretation could
prove fatal where the question involved is uniformity rather than
interference with interstate commerce, because one of the reasons for
measuring the tax by gross receipts is to circumvent the constitutional
limitations applicable to property taxation. However, the true pur-
pose of these decisions is to establish a distinction between statutes
which obviously attempt to burden interstate commerce and those
which merely use gross receipts to measure a tax the State has the
legitimate power to impose.0 4 In the particular instances where the
tax is called a property tax the legitimate power of the State is exer-
cised through the taxation of property In other instances the State
exercises its legitimate power by taxing the corporate franchise or
privilege and simply uses gross receipts to measure the amount of
business done. In these cases the Supreme Court makes the same
distinction regarding the object of the legislation as it does in the
"property tax" cases.'"-- As is shown in the Ohio Tax Cases,"6 the
Court, in both situations, is concerned primarily with the effect of the
legislation on interstate commerce, rather than determining if the
exaction is one upon property rights or upon franchise and privileges.
Mr. Justice Holmes commented on the distinction in Galveston, Hams-
burg and San Antonia Railway Company v Texas, as follows:197
"It appears sufficiently, perhaps from what has been said,
that we are to look for a practical rather than a logical or philosoplu-
cal distinction. The State must be allowed to tax the property and
to tax it at its actual value as a going concern. On the other hand
the State cannot tax the interstate business. The two necessities
hardly admit of an absolute logical reconciliation. Yet the distinc-
tion is not without sense. When a legislature is trying simply to
value property, it is less likely to attempt to or effect injunous regula-
tion than when it is aiming directly at the receipts from interstate
commerce. A practical line can be drawn by taking the whole
' 'State v. Great Northern Railroad Company, 278 U. S. 503 (1929); Cudahy
Packing Company v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450 (1917); U. S. Express Company v.
Minne~ota, 223 U. S. 335 (1911); Wisconsin and Michigan Railway Company v.
Powers, 191 U. S. 379 (1903).
1'" U. S. Express Company v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335, 344 (1911).
' Maine v. Grand Trunk Railroad Company, 142 U. S. 217 (1890).
232 U. S. 576 (1913).11'1210 U. S. 217, 227 (1907).
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scheme of taxation into account. That must be done by this court
as best it can."
In this vein it is appropriate to add that the "whole scheme" of the
Supreme Court decisions pertaining to a tax measured by gross re-
ceipts is designed to permit the State considerable freedom in legiti-
mate taxation. Certainly it is not designed to furnish conclusive au-
thor:ty on the nature of the tax.
It is of the utmost importance to a legislature to know that the
State may levy a gross receipts tax which is consistent with the Federal
Constitution not only by designating the tax as one on property, but
also by making the privilege to do business the subject of the tax. This
knowledge, or rather its absence, is illustrated perfectly in Chicago,
Rock Island and Pacific Rail'oad Company v Robertson.I'", The Mis-
sissippi legislature enacted a statute taxing the railroad cars of freight
line companies according to a certain percentage of their gross earn-
ings. The statute provided that all cars used exclusively within the
state, or used partially within and without the state "are hereby de-
clared to have a situs in the state, and the value of such property for
the purpose of taxation is to be determined as provided for by sections
four (4) and five (5) of the act." 9 9 Sections four and five measured
the tax by gross earnings and further provided that gross earnings
should include earnings on business beginning and ending within the
state, and a proportion, based on mileage, of earnings of all interstate
business passing through or into or out of the state. The statute pro-
vided explicitly that the exaction was "to be a tax on its property and
in lieu of all other taxes upon the same."2 "0  Obviouslv, the legisla-
ture s intention was to tax the freight line companies as going concerns
without burdening interstate commerce, and the court disposed of this
aspect of the case with ease by saying.
20
'
"If the tax here sought to be collected is imposed di-
rectly on the company s gross earmngs as such, they being derived
partly if not wholly, from interstate commerce, it is a burden on such
commerce and consequently void. But if the gross earmngs of the
company are simply taken as the measure of the value of the cars
owned by the company that come into the state of Mississippi, and
the amount of the tax is not in excess of what would be legitimate
as an ordinary tax on the cars with reference to their use as part of
a going concern, it does not in fact restrain or burden such commerce,
and will be valid if permitted by the state Constitution.
"The contention of counsel for the company therefore is,
and sections 3 and 4 of the statute so declare, that the tax is on the
122 Miss. 417 84 So. 449 (1920).
122 Miss. 417, 419, 84 So. 449 (1920).
Ibid.
Id. at 420, 84 So. at 450.
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cars of the company that are used partially within and without the
state: the aggregate amount of the rentals received therefor by the
company being simply taken as the measure of their value."
The problem posed by section 112 of the Mississippi Constitution
proved more difficult. The pertinent parts of this section provided:
20 2
"Taxation shall be uniform and equal throughout the
state. Property shall be taxed in proportion to its value. Prop-
erty shall be assessed for taxes under general laws, and by uniform
rules, according to its true value. But the legislature may provide
for railroads, and railroad and other corporate property, or for par-
ticular species of property belonging to persons, corporations, or
associations not situated wholly in one county. But all such property
shall be assessed at its true value, and no county shall be denied the
right to levy county and special taxes upon such assessment as in other
cases of property situated and assessed in the county."
The court construed the constitutional provision to mean that all prop-
ertv must be assessed at its true value, and that there must be no dis-
crimination in rates between different species of property In other
words, all property must be taxed at the same rate on its true value.
It found that neither of these requirements was met in the statute
under consideration because gross earnings from the cars was sub-
stituted for their true value and the rate of taxation was different from
that imposed on other property The court did indicate some con-
cern for the practical result reached in its decision when it added:2 0 3
"That the legislature may have been of the opinion that
the amount of taxes that would be paid by freight line companies
under this statute would be a just equivalent for the taxes they would
pay on the true value of their property conferred upon it no power
to enact the statute, for the Constitution as now written forbids the
substitution of any other method of t,-ang property for the one
therein prescribed. The question here under consideration is one of
power and not of economics."
Thus the state constitutional limitation requiring uniformity of
taxation according to true value served to restrict severely the legis-
lature's power to tax, even where a careful effort was made to exercise
that power in a manner consistent with the Federal Constitution.
Granting that the court was handicapped by the legislature's express
description of the nature of the tax, it is not necessary to rewrite the
Mississippi uniformity provision in order to reach the corporation's
gross earnings, although the ambiguous wording and unnecessary
restrictions of that provision tend only to confuse the issue. Both the
legislature and the court in the instant case were victirs of the rigid
conceptualism referred to before. They thought of the tax only as a
-Id. at 421, 84 So. at 450.
1-1 122 Miss l 417, 423, 84 So. 449, 451 (1920).
KENTuCKY LAW JOURNAL
property tax, and therefore could not break with the traditional idea
that the only way to tax a corporation doing business in interstate
commerce is to levy against its property according to true value. This
preoccupation with the nature of the tax caused the legislature to call
the tax a levy on the railroad cars when it could have conceived of the
tax as one levied on the corporation for the privilege of doing business
in the state. The court thought the only alternative to calling the tax
a property tax was to describe it as one levied directly against the gross
earnings which clearly were derived in part from interstate commerce.
It might well have advised the legislature to eliminate the express
reference to the nature of the tax and thereby opened the way for
successful enactment of the statute on the privilege theory That this
theory was known to the court is apparent from the historical analysis
it made of the uniformity provision. In describing a provision in the
Constitution of 1869 similar to section 112, the court said: 20 4
"While that Constitution was in force, the legislature,
with the approval of this court, was accustomed to impose privilege
taxes on certain characters of business in lieu of an ad valorem tax on
the property used therein. But the convention of 1890, evidently
for the purpose of insuring equality of taxation by preventing such
discriminations in the methods of valuation, rewrote the sec-
tion, and among other things provided that property shall be assessed
for taxes at its "true value"
This last statement leaves the impression that the court thought section
112 required privilege taxes to be levied according to true value, but
there is nothing in the provision which requires more than the taxation
of property according to true value. Apparently the court still was
blinded at this point by the notion that a gross receipts tax is always a
property tax.
This case reveals the confusion caused by the uniformity pro-
visions and the techniques that are used to apply and interpret them.
To begin with the Mississippi provision was archaic and created a
difficult situation for the legislature by denying it the power to classify
property The legislature, faced with the need for taxing freight line
companies in a manner which would reflect their true wealth, mis-
conceived the extent of its power under the Federal Constitution and
levied a property tax. The court in turn showed little imagination
in discussing the constitutionality of the tax, although it recognized
that its interpretation was contrary to economic necessity It tested
the statute by the time tried technique of labeling the nature of the
tax and found that it was prohibited by the constitutional limitation.
Thus this limiation served only to prevent the legislature from equal-
-' 122 Miss. 417 422, 84 So. 449, 450 (1920).
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izing the tax burden. At best such a result contributes little to uni-
formity in taxation in the modern sense.
As a matter of fact, the Mississippi court failed to reach as en-
lightened a result as the one achieved by the Nebraska court in
Western Union Telegraph Company v City of Omaha,20 5 decided
fifteen years earlier. There the court, in applying a similar constitu-
tional provision to a similar tax, made it plain that the statute could
be sustained if the sections pertaining to the method of valuation and
the nature of the tax were removed. After finding the statute invalid,
the court said:2 -' '1
"There is nothing to prevent provisions of law similar to
those affecting insurance compames from being applied to com-
panies engaged in the express, telegraph or telephone business, so
far as levying a tax upon their business as measured by the gross
receipts is concerned. The only fault to be found with the sections
applying to these occupations as they nov stand is that the legislature
said too much when it provided that the franchise should be valued,
and the gross receipts taken as the measure of the value. The gross
receipts may be taken as a proper measure of the amount of business
tax to be levied upon such business, but may not be arbitrarily taken
as a measure of the value of the franchise."
The distinctions made between the "property tax" theory and the
"privilege tax" theory are significant only where the State's power to
tax property is limited. Sometimes it is found, as in Minnesota, that
"the state has the constitutional right to impose a tax upon the property
within its borders, regardless of the use to which it is devoted by its
owners, and, as a method of determining what is a fair and equitable
property tax, it may permit the tax to be computed on the basis of a
fixed percentage of the gross earnings of the property "207
SECTION 4
Sales Taxes
A tax levied on the receipts derived from the sale of property dif-
fers very little from a tax on a corporation measured by a certain
percentage of its gross receipts or earnings. Statutes providing for
this type of tax are usually sustained on the basis that the subject of
the tax is the privilege or occupation engaged in rather than the prop-
erty itself. It is on this theory that a tax on every person m the state
engaged in the business of selling any tangible property, real or per-
'73 Neb. 527 103 N. W 84 (1905).
-' 73 Neb. 527 546, 103 N. IV 84, 91 (1905).
"'Statc v. Northwestern Telephone Exchange Company, 107 Minn. 390, 120
N. W. 534 (1909).
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sonal, at a certain rate upon the gross receipts of the business is called
an "occupation privilege sales tax," and not a property tax which would
violate the constitutional requirement that taxes shall be uniform and
ad valorem on all property subject to be taxed.2 08 Arguments invok-
ing the idea that "property" is anything subject to ownership and that
one's business and its earnings are owned by him and therefore are
property, though often made, are not strong enough to overcome the
privilege explanation.2 0 9 The fact that the tax normally is collectible
only from those persons who are engaged in the business of selling is
one of the factors which determines the nature of the tax. This fea-
ture of the statute outweighs the fact that the retail selling price of
property is indicative of its value, and that a tax measured by value
often is a property tax. Thus it is held in Lionel's Cigar Store v.
McFarland,210 that a tax imposed by a statute which declares its ob-
ject to be the levying of a tax upon retail dealers in tobacco is not a
property tax although the statute further provides that "there is hereby
levied a tax, in the sum hereinafter set forth, 'upon tobacco and tobacco
products' of 10 per cent of the retail selling price of said products at
retail " Also it is of importance that a tax on sales assessed at a
percentage of the amount of sales is not a specific sum imposed on
the sale of particular property,2 1i because this interpretation eliminates
the possibility of attacking the statute on the ground that it taxes
property without regard for its value, and therefore violates constitu-
tional provisions requiring that property be taxed on an ad valorem
basis.
The privilege theory, which most courts will find underlies the
sales tax, makes this form of legislation one of the best methods avail-
able to the legislature in its efforts to reach sources of revenue other-
wise protected from the burden of taxation by constitutional limitations
on the power to tax. In upholding South Dakota's general sales tax
imposed both on the sale of services and the sale of goods, and meas-
ured by a certain percentage of gross receipts, the court of that state
emphasized this point by holding: 212
"It would appear, therefore, that, though tlus statute
cannot reach the gross receipts dollar merely by calling it an income
dollar or by imposing a tax upon it as such, it may be possible never-
theless, by virtue of the privilege concept, to reach the gross receipts
dollar to some extent as the measure of the amount of a legitimate
tax upon a privilege."
- Standard Oil Company of Kentucky v. State Revenue Commission, 179 Ga.
371, 176 S. E. 1 (1934).
-Siner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 25 P 2d 91 (1933).
21 162 La. 956, 111 So. 841 (1927).
- Rome v. McWilliams, 52 Ga. 251 (1874).
-"-'State ex rel Botkin v. Walsh, 61 S. D. 593, 251 N. W. 189 (1933).
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In a somewhat sinilar way the Alabama legislature successfully n-
posed a five per cent net income tax on banks which employed money
capital coming into competition with the business of national banks by
defining the tax as an excise for the privilege of engaging m the busi-
ness of conducting such a financial institution in the state. In sus-
taming the statute the court said:2 1i
"That the statute has provisions for ascertaining net in-
come, such as deductions, exemptions and credits analogous to pro-
visions of income tax laws, cannot affect the essential nature of the
ta.x as one levied upon the privilege of doing a defined business."
On the strength of interpretations much like those mentioned above
a statute requiring any person operating any office building to pay a
sum equal to one tenth of one per cent of the gross rents imposes a
tax on the business of operating an office building rather than a direct
tax on the building itself,2"- and an ad valorem tax imposed by a city
ordinance on the accounts receivable from the sales of dairy products
is not a property tax, and therefore does not violate the uniformity
clause of the state constitution because of certain exemptions made.21
In the latter case the court found: " "
"A tax on a business or occupation because it is measured
by the number of pieces of property used in said business, although
the pieces of property are subject to ad valorem taxation, is not a tax
on property within the meaning of the term as used in the Constitu-
tion. It follows that a tax on sales, which may constitute a part or
all of the business of the party taxed, is not a tax on property within
the meamng of the Constitution merely because the tax is measured
by the accounts receivable resulting from sales."
In addition to the advantages gained in the way of permissible
exemptions and graduations under the privilege theory, its use pre-
cludes the raising of questions of double taxation which arises fre-
quentlv under the uniformity provisions. For instance, in Michigan a
sales tax and a tax on chain stores graduated by the number of stores
do not constitute double taxation because the two taxes are on differ-
ent privileges and are measured differently 217 Where the tax is
thought of as a property tax it is much easier to find that the property
has been subjected to taxation previously Although retail sales tax
legislation is almost always sustained on the ground that it does not
"Titlc Guarantee Loan and Trust Company v. State, 228 Ala. 636, 155 So.
:301 (1934).
State v. Heymann, 178 La. 479, 151 So. 901 (1933).
'City of Atlanta v. Georgia Milk Producers Association, 187 Ga. 117, 200
S. E. 713 (1938).
Ibid.
.. C. F Smith Company v. Fitzgerald, 270 Mich. 659, 259 N. W 337 (1935).
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impose a property tax,"'51 it does present to the courts some nice prob-
lems in labeling the nature of the tax. In \Viseinan v Phillips,"19 the
court put the point rhetorically by saying-
"What kind of tax is it? What is it a tax upon? Some of
counsel say that it is a property tax, others that it is an occupation
tax, and others that it is either a gross income tax or an occupation
tax, while another says it has all the earmarks of a property tax.
Counsel for appellant and those amzct curiae supporting that view
contend that it is neither a tax on property, an occupation tax, nor a
tax on gross income; that it is an excise tax or privilege tax, and the
argument is made with some force that it is a tax upon the nht to
acquire personal property by purchase for use or consumption.
After reviewing its previous decisions defining the nature of an
inheritance tax, income tax, use tax and severance tax, the Arkansas
Court solved the problem of the sales tax, so far as the uniformity
provision was concerned, by finding that it, like the other taxes men-
tioned, was not a property tax.-2" It took the wise position that there
was no need to define the exact nature ot the tax, and in so doing
avoided the meaningless distinctions so often made in interpreting the
uniformity provisions. The pitfalls incidental to the questionable
practice of engaging in an unnecessary debate on the precise nature
of the tax are revealed in a concurring opinion in the Wiseman Case.
Johnson, C. J., considered himself governed by the decisions reviewed
in the majority opinion, but he left no doubt as to his dissatisfaction
with the result reached in them. In pointing out two reasons why the
previous decisions should be overruled, he made some unusual state-
ments both about constitutional construction and the nature of certain
kinds of taxes. He said in part:2 21
"Under settled principles of constitutional interpretation,
these provisions of our Constitution should be treated as a limitation
upon the powers of taxation. Since the Constitution prescribes what
taxes may be levied, it impliedly prohibits any other kind of taxation
not therein provided for. 'To specify is. to exclude is a maxim of
interpretation. The Constitution specifies what taxes may be imposed.
Therefore, no taxes may be levied which are not specified."
As a matter of fact the Arkansas Constitution contained a uni-
formity provision no different from that found in many state constitu-
tions. It provided that: "All property subject to taxation shall be
2W$ Wiseman v. Phillips, 191 Ark. 63, 84 S. TV 2d 91 (1935); Leonard v. Maxwell,
216 N. C. 89, 3 S. E. 2d 316 (1939); Jensen Candy Company v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 90 Utah 359, 61 P 2d 629 (1936); Morrow v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 625, ,17 P
2d 1016 (1935).
191 Ark. 63, 84 S. W. 2d 91 (1935).
:Id. at 71, 84 S. AV 2d 95 (1935).
.t191 Ark. 63, 77 84 S. W. 2d 91, 98 (1935).
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taxed according to value; that value to be ascertained in such manner
as the General Assembly shall direct, making the same equal and
uniform throughout the State."2 2 2 To this general provision was
added a more specific requirement that "No one species of property,
from which a tax may be collected, shall be taxed higher than another
species of property of equal value, provided, the General Assembly
shall have power from time to time, to tax hawkers, peddlers, ferries,
exhibitions and privileges "223 As to the nature of certain kinds
of taxes it was said:224
"Moreover, the line of cases last referred to should be
overruled for still another reason. Fundamentally courts should be
interested in realities and not nomenclatures. Realities are ignored
in each of the cases referred to. An inheritance tax is a tax on prop-
erty and not a hybrid tax. Likewise a severance tax is a tax on
property, and not a cross-breed tax. Demonstrably certain is an
income tax one on property and not an excise tax as decided by a
majority of this court in Sims v. Ahrens and Stanley v. Gates, supra.
The two last mentioned cases are true hybrids, the off-spring of
illogic and misnomer.
"The sales tax is a property tax beyond questions, cavil
or doubt, when measured by constitutional law and logic. The
true rule is a tax on sale of an article is a tax on the article itself
Not the least startling feature of such an attitude regarding the func-
tion of the uniformity provision, to say nothing of the remarks about
inheritance, income, and severance taxes, is the fact that it was ex-
pressed in 1935, at a time when the state government of Arkansas, like
many others, was faced with a grave financial crisis. On this point
Johnson, C. J., said:2 2 5
"Necessity of raising revenue should never be considered
so urgent as to warrant courts to either ignore or rewrite the Con-
stitution. For seventy-five years we treated article 16, section 5, as
a limitation upon the Legislature's taxing power, and I perceive no
good reason for overturning the wisdom of the ages and not only
opemng, but destroying the flood gates of taxation, and I fear the
ultimate results."
It is safe to say that few judicial opinions contain so much "contrary
dictum" in so few sentences as this "concurring" one. It represents the
ultimate in the way of restrictive interpretation and narrow definitions
made in the name of uniformity
-Id. at 71.84 S. V 2d at 95.
-'Ibid.
191 Ark. 63 ,77. 84 S. W. 2d 91. 98 (1935).
-'Id. at 78, 84 S. W 2d at 98.
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SECTION 5
Severance Taxes and Use Taxes
Statutes which impose a tax on the severance or production of
property and on the use of property are two other types of legislation
in which property value is taken as a measure of the levy Both are
sometimes contested on the theory that a tax on the right to extract
natural resources or the right to put property to a particular use is a
tax on ownership and therefore a property tax. The same general
tests in terms of the nature of the tax are applied to this type of legis-
lation, and the distinctons discussed above relating to property tax
theories and privilege tax theories also are applied by the courts in
upholding or invalidating these statutes. Thus the courts in one line
of cases uphold a "gross production" tax equal to two percent of the
gross value of the production of certain minerals as a tax on the busi-
ness of mining or producing minerals, 22 and find that a statute pro-
viding that every person engaged in the business of operating a coal
mine shall pay a "license or privilege tax" in an amount equal to two
cents per ton on all coal mined is not a property tax upon the coal,
but an occupation tax on the business of mining measured by the
tonnage.227 Similarly, a tax on crude oil equal to one per cent of the
market value,22s a severance tax on oil and gas measured by the num-
ber of gallons,2 29 and a tax on the business of mining and drilling oil
measured by the value of the articles produced as shown by gross
proceeds of their sale, with a different rate for different products, -2 :11
do not violate the constitutional limitations applicable to property
taxes. The court so held in Floyd v Miller Lumber Company,2 3i
where the statute provided in very broad language for the tax on the
business of "severing from the soil or water for commercial purposes
natural resources" including timber, ores, and other minerals. How-
ever, Mr. Justice Wood dissented in the Floyd Case giving rather elo-
quent expression to the property tax theory He said: " '-2
"The owners of the lands and waters containing the van-
ous natural resources are, by virtue of such ownership, also owners
of the natural products at which this act was leveled. Those prod-
ucts give to the lands, as shown by the facts alleged, and which are
by the demurrer admitted to be true, their only value. The only
possible use that can be made of these products is by severing them
'Re Gross Production Tax, 53 Okla. 25, 154 Pac. 362 (1915).
"'Republic Iron and Steel Company v. State, 204 Ala. 469, 86 So. 65 (1920).
Swiss Oil Company v. Shanks, 208 Ky. 64, 270 S. V 478 (1925).
-,9 Glynn v. State Tax Commission, 38 N. M. 131, 28 P 2d 889 (1934).
20Gass Company v. Hall, 102 IV Va. 272, 135 S. E. 582 (1926).
=t 160 Ark. 17 254 S. XV 450 (1923) affiried: 273 U. S. 672 (1927).
21 Ibid.
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from the soil and water for commercial purposes. To deprive the
owners by law of tlus use would be virtually a confiscation of their
property, and to tax this use is to tax the only available purpose or
use which the property has. Some of the timbers to be cut, as shown
by the facts, are on lands situated on islands that are not susceptible
of cultivation, and much of it is on tracts that can never be available
for homestead or agricultural purposes. There the timber thus sit-
uated cannot be and is not to be used for fencing purposes, or orna-
mental shade trees, or other uses about a home and farm. Likewise,
the various other natural products named cannot be used and have
no value whatever, unless they are severed from the soil and water
for commercial purposes. Such is the plain common sense meamng
of the words of the statute. Since the act levies a tax on the business
of severing from the soil or water for commercial purposes natural
resources its lays upon owners of such resources a tax burden which
restricts them from the free enjoyment and use of these resources. It
follows that a tax on the attributes of ownership is a tax on the prop-
erty itself."
Generally the reasoning suggested by the dissent in the Floyd Case
is followed in the line of decisions which hold that severance and pro-
duction taxes are property taxes, although considerable emphasis is
placed on the way the tax is levied or assessed. The latter factor is
evident in the case where a statute required all corporations organ-
ized under the laws of the state for the purpose of mining to pay a
tax on each ton of copper and iron ore mined, shipped or disposed of.
The tax was held a property tax because the levy was in lieu of all taxes
or assessments upon the capital stock, personal property, and real prop-
erty of the corporation..2 33 The same result was reached where a
statute providing for the taxation of the gross products of all mines
being worked required the state board of equalization to assess the
value of the gross products like any other property 2
34
In Thompson v McLeod,"35 the Mississippi Court placed its de-
cision squarely on the reasoning pointed out by Mr. Justice Woods.
The legislature passed a statute imposing a tax of a certain amount
per cup or box for the privilege of carrying on the business of ex-
tracting turpentine from standing trees. The court found that the
tax was a property tax within the meaning of the constitutional pro-
vision that property shall be taxed in proportion to its value, and
further that since the land was already taxed that the statute was in-
valid because it provided for double taxation. In describing the tax
the court asserted: " 36
"The act under review does not levy a privilege tax on
the right of selling resin or gum from the tree as originally ex-
-'State v. Lakeside Land Compai, 71 Minn. 283, 73 N. W 970 (1898).
Miller v. Buck Greek Oil Company, 38 Wvo. 505, 269 Pac. 43 (1928).
- 112 Mis,;. 3S3, 73 So. 193 (1916).
'112 Miss. 383. 388. 73 So. 193, 194 (1916).
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tracted , but the privilege, if any, which is taxed is the pn-
vilege or right of the owner or lessee of pine trees to 'extract' turpen-
tine from standing trees. It is true the act in other language refers
to it as a business-a business of extracting turpentine from standing
trees. The imposition of such a tax is not on a business, but on the
property involved."
Then the court interjected into its decision an aspect of the familiar
argument that to tax the ownership of property is to tax the property
by saying rather unusually .237
"This act strikes down the inherent right of the property
owner to lay hand upon his own property. Every owner of a pine
tree enjoys the same natural right to extract gum from the tree as
the owner of a vineyard has to pluck is grapes. It would be the
same tung to require a privilege tax as a precedent right of the
owner to pull the ripe pecans from us pecan orchard, or to enjoy
a drink of pure water from the cool spring of the old homestead."
SECTION 6
The "Ownership" Theory
In spite of its frequent use, the idea that a tax levied by reason
of ownership is a tax on the property is just as unsatisfactory a test
in "uniformity" cases as the other tests described above, and its ap-
plication results in just as many conflicting opinions as to whether
specific tax legislation is subject to the constitutional limitations on
the power to tax. A court is just as apt to find that a statute imposes
a privilege tax after applying the "ownership" rule as it is under any
other criterion, and vice versa. In Lutz. v Arnold,238 for example, the
court had before it a tax imposed by a statute providing that every
person residing in the state should pay a fee for the right to exercise
any one or more of the following privileges: signing, executing, and
issuing intangibles; selling, signing, transferring, renewing, removing,
consigning, mailing, shipping, trading in and enforcing intangibles;
receiving the income, increase, issue, and profits of intangibles; having
and possessing the right to transmit the same by will, and of making
gifts of them and of having the right to allow such property to pass to
other persons by descent under the laws of the state; and for the right
to have such intangibles separately classified for taxes. The legislation
studiously avoided making the intangible property itself the subject
of the tax, and therefore it was attacked on the grounds that the
privileges named were privileges of ownership, and because of this
the statute was an invalid attempt to tax property contrary to the
rules of uniformity The court found the tax was an excise because the
17 Ibzd.
"1208 Ind. 480, 193 N. E. 840 (1935).
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statute on its face did not attempt to impose a tax on the property,
because it fixed the rate of the tax and the method of measuring the
amount, and because the tax was not payable until the privileges set
out in the act were actually exercised. As for the argument that the
pnvileges represented incidents of ownership the court said:2 39
"The tax imposed may be said to be an excise upon the
particular privilege or privileges enumerated in doing certain thungs.
There is a distinct difference between the mere ownership of prop-
rty and the performance of certain acts of business. It is con-
tended that the act in question does not tax the exercise of any
privilege, but the right to exercise the incidents of ownership, and
the right to devote the property to the only use to which it is adopted.
We do not assent to this contention. The same contention could be
made of the gasoline tax and other like taxes. The only use the
owner of an automobile can have is to operate it, but in order to
operate it, the gasoline must be used and the tax on the gasoline is
an excise tax."
Other states have passed so-called intangibles tax statutes in recent
years, and the courts have sustained them by calling them excises as
was done ii the Lutz Case,24" without any indications that the owner-
ship idea should control.
On the other hand, there is little to distinguish the Lutz Case from
Hixon v. School Di.str1Ct,2 4i except that a precisely opposite result is
reached. In the latter case the statute imposed on the state treasurer
and county treasurers a tax of one per cent of the face value of all
warrants paid by them, and required the amount to be deducted from
the warrants and deposited in the state treasury to the credit of the
old-age pension fund. The court found the tax was not a privilege or
an excise tax but a tax on property Adopting clearly the "attributes
of ownership" proposition in its decision, the court found:2 42
"In substance and m legal effect the tax is a tax on prop-
erty. No definition of property can be framed which does not include
the right of ownership. Property, therefore, in its broad and legal
sense, is not only the physical thing which may be the subject of
ownership, but is the ownership itself. The essential attributes of
ownership are the right of dominon, possession, enjoyment, and dis-
position. A warrant represents a certain value in money. Owner-
ship of the warrant involves the right to receive and possess the
money. This right is an attribute of ownership, and therefore of
property; and a tax on its exercise or enjoyment is a tax on property."
2 '208 Ind. 480. 488, 193 N. E. 840, 844 (1935).
Sivel v. County Treasurer, 295 Mich. 10, 294 N. E. 78 (1940); McPherson v.
Fisher, 19-13 Ore. 615, 23 P 2d 913 (1933); Froldlert Malting Company v. Tax Com-
mission. 221 Wis. 225, 267 N. W 52 (1936). Cf. State v. Hunt, 56 Ohio App. 120,
I1 N. E. 155 (1936). But see- Barnes v. Jones. 139 Miss. 675, 103 So. 773 (1925).
' 187 Ark. 554. 60 S. IV 2d 1027 (1933).
'Id. at 559. 60 S. IV 2d at 1028.
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In point of fact there is as much reason for calling this tax on warrants
a business or privilege tax as there is in the Lutz Case for saying that
the transfer of intangibles, et cetera, by any individual constitutes a
"doing of business" sufficient to establish "a distinct difference between
the mere ownership of property and the performance of certain acts
of business." In the same way it is difficult to see that the attributes
of ownership enumerated in the Hixon Case, i.e., dominion, possession,
enjoyment and disposition, are not, for all practical purposes, taxed
successfully in the Lutz Case. Use of the "ownership" rule is just an-
other way of engaging in analytical conceptualism and gains a court
nothing more than the satisfaction of having something to point to in
justification of the result reached in the particular case. At least it
does not provide the legislator or taxpayer with any realistic standard
to use in judging the legal effect of specific tax legislation, or of the
uniformity provisions. Perhaps it is impossible to formulate a definitive
test, but this one is vulnerable to the criticism made before that a
test concerned exclusively with the nature of the tax fails to reflect all
the factors involved. Not the least important of these additional factors
is whether the court thinks the constitutional limitation on the power
to tax should be invoked.
There is no better illustration of the logic the courts are prone to
engage in when applying these rigid conceptualistic tests than the
Supreme Court's decision in Dawson v Kentucky Distilleries and
Warehouse Company.243 In 1920, the legislature of Kentucky passed
a statute which imposed a so-called annual license tax upon every
person engaged in the business of manufacturing whiskey or "in the
business of owning and storing" it in bonded warehouses within the
state. The levy provided for was a tax of fifty cents a gallon upon all
whiskey either withdrawn from bond or transferred in bond from
Kentucky to a point outside that state. The case came to the Supreme
Court on direct appeal from the District Court's finding that the tax
was one on property It was admitted that if the tax was a property
tax, it violated Kentucky's constitutional provision requiring uniform-
ity Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the Court and sus-
tained the lower court's finding. Largely through a process of elim-
ination he found that the tax, as had been stated by the District Court,
really was upon "the act of the owner in taking his property out of
stoiage into his own possession (absolute or qualified) for the pur-
pose of making some one of the only uses of which it is capable, i.e.,
consumption, sale, or keeping for future consumption or sale. '2 44 On
"1-255 U. S. 288 (1921).
N1 255 U. S. 288, 294 (1921).
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finding this act to be the subject of the tax, Justice Brandeis con-
cluded: "To levy a tax by reason of ownership of property is to tax
the property"
It is even more interesting to see how the "business or occupation"
theory, which the legislature had expressly provided for, stood up
under Justice Brandeis' examination. He found the tax had none of
the ordinary incidents of an occupation tax because a particular lot
of whiskey could pass through a dozen or more bonded warehouses
without one of them being required to pay the tax. Only the ware-
houseman who had the whiskey on storage at the time of its removal
from bond or transfer in bond to another state had to pay the tax.
Further, the business of merely owmng and storing whiskey in bond
was not made taxable for so long as the whiskey was stored in bond
within the state it was free of the tax. Likewise he found the tax was
not imposed upon the business of owning, storing, and removing
whiskey from bond for the tax "would become payable on account of
whiskey removed, although there had not been storage for any ap-
preciable time; thus, the tax would be paable on whiskey if it had
been removed from the warehouse immediately after the approval of
the act."2 4', Nor, in his opinion, was the tax one on the business of
removing liquor owned for the tax was payable in respect to any lot
of whiskey removed, and "a single transaction does not constitute
engaging in the business, be it that of buying and selling whiskey or
in the business of otherwise using it."246 Thus it is seen that the
legislation failed to achieve the purpose intended by the legislature
on a great many counts.
It would be presumptuous to question the decision of Mr. Justice
Brandeis directly on the facts in the particular case. However, in
view of the Lutz Case, and others like it where the privilege theory
is used to sustain legislation hardly distinguishable from the instant
statute, and the general confusion which has resulted from applica-
tion of the "ownership" formula, the present effect of the Dawson Case
is an entirely different matter. The Supreme Court has had a similar
opportunity to pass on the nature of certain kinds of taxes in its
effort to formulate an answer to the question: what is a direct tax?
The cases on which its theory is based have been treated thoroughly
many times, and an exhaustive reexamination of them is not necessary
at this point, but a brief review is essential to a better understanding
of the Brandeis opinion and the discussion of taxes which may be
labeled property or non-property
'-":255 U. S. 288, 293 (1921).
"' Id. at 294.
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Prior to the Pollock Cases of 1895, it was reasonably clear that the
Supreme Court considered only capitation taxes and taxes on land as
direct within the meaning of the Constitution. Beginning with the
dictum to this effect in the Hylton Case,247 the idea was followed in a
number of well-known cases. In Pacific Insurance Company v
Souls, 248 the court held that a tax on incomes of insurance companies
was an indirect' tax. In Veazze Bank v Fenno,"49 a tax on state bank
notes was held an indirect tax and the Hylton Case again was relied
upon. In Scheley v Rew, 250 an inheritance tax was classified as in-
direct, and in Sprnger v United States,251 the same result was reached
on an income tax imposed on individuals. In the last named case the
court said: 252
"Our conclusions are that direct taxes, within the mean-
ing of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that
instrument, and taxes on real estate
In all these cases the smilarity between the problem of apportionment
under the Federal Constitution and the problem of uniformity under
the state constitutions is very apparent. In both situations the consti-
tutional provision serves as the principal limitation on the taxing
power, and the-wording of the provisions has led the courts to adopt
a method of classifying taxes according to their nature in applying the
limitation.
When the Supreme Court declared the income tax law of 1894
unconstitutional in the Pollock Cases," 3 it not only started an endless
controversy about what that decision actually held, but it created
considerable uncertaintyas to the legal nature of taxes in general.
Most of this uncertainty stemmed from a phrase in the opinion of
Chief Justice Fuller when he asked the question:2 54
"Can it be properly held that the Constitution, taken in
its plain and obvious sense, and with due regard to the circumstances
attending the formation of the government, authorizes a general
unapportioned tax on the products of the farm and the rents of real
estate, although imposed merely because of ownership, and with no
possible means of escape from payment, as belonging to a totally
different class from that which includes the property from whence
the income proceeds?"
Whether the phrase: "although imposed merely because of ownership"
"' Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171 (U. S. 1796).
"s7 Wall. 433 (U. S. 1868).
'9 8 Wall. 331 (U. S. 1874).
'23 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869).
102 U. S. 586 (1890).
'-"Id. at 593.
157 U. S. 429 (1895); 158 U. S. 601 (1895).
158 U. S. 627-628 (1895).
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was an essential part of the decision is a moot question, but it was
seized upon by later courts and developed into a decisive basis for
classifving taxes. In Nicol v Ames,' -'' the first case after the income
tax decision, the Court passed on the constitutionality of a tax levied
upon sales at business exchanges. It held that the tax was on the
"privilege, opportunity or facility, offered at boards of trade or ex-
changes for the transaction of the business mentioned in the act." This
was a rather unusual way to sustain the tax and resulted from the
Court's interpretation of the decision in the Pollock Case. If, as the
court implied, a tax on property as such was a direct tax then a tax
on sales logically would have been a direct tax although it had always
been considered an excise. Finally in Knowlton v Moore,25 6 the Court
came face to face with its previous decisions emphasizing the "owner-
ship" interpretation of the Pollock Cases. The statute involved im-
posed a succession tax upon legacies or distributive shares of per-
sonalty passing at death, and counsel argued that there were certain
inherent rights of ownership, and that to tax these rights was to tax
the property owned. Further, it was contended that the right of
transmission upon death was such a right. This argument was based
on the assumption that the first step in establishing that a tax is direct
is to show that it is a property tax. It differs little from the argument
advanced so often in the "uniformity" cases. Although the court
reasserted the proposition previously implied in the Nicol Case that a
tax on property because of ownership is a direct tax, it held that an
inheritance tax was not upon an inherent right of ownership to trans-
fer property after death. Instead it found that the tax was on a pri-
vilege. Two years later, in Patton v Brady,*-7 the Court again found
that a tax upon manufactured tobacco in the hands of a dealer was
an excise tax and not a tax on property as such. With very little
elaboration of its doctrine other than to quote definitions of excises the
Court continued to find that few, if any, taxes were direct.
In Thomas v United States,25 8 a stamp act on sales of certificates
of stock was called a privilege tax because the sale of stock was but
a particular business transaction in the exercise of the corporation's
privilege to dispose of property in the form of certificates. In Spreckele
Sugar Refining Company v McCla -n,2 '9 a tax upon the gross annual
receipts of any corporation carrying on the business of refining sugar
- 173 U. S. 41 (1900).
- 178 U. S. 608 (1902).
- 184 U. S. 608 (1902).
- 192 U. S. 397 (1904).
'zl 192 U. S. 363 (1904).
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was held an excise, and in Flint v Stone Tracy Company,"0 previously
discussed, the corporation income tax was upheld as an excise upon the
privilege of engaging in the insurance business. In Brushaber v Union
Pacific Railroad Company," 1 in which the Sixteenth Amendment was
interpreted, Chief Justice White carefully maintained that from the
t-me of the Hylton Case, "it had come to be accepted that direct taxes
in the constitutional sense were confined to taxes levied directly on
real estate because of its ownership;" and in Stanton v Baltic Mining
Company,26 2 it was held that a tax on the product of mines was not a
direct tax on property because inadequate allowance was made for
exhaustion of the body of ore, but that it was an excise on the mining
operations.
This, then, was the general background on the Supreme Court's
theory of a direct tax at the time of the Dawson Case. To put it an-
other way, when the Court decided that the Kentucky statute imposed
a .property tax and therefore was in violation of the uniformity pro-
vision of the Kentucky Constitution, it had said for a number of years
that a tax levied on property because of ownership was a direct tax,
but when presented an actual act of Congress for analysis had always
decided that the tax was an excise. In spite of the Court's verbal ad-
herence to the "ownership" theory, it had never found a tax levied by
the Federal Government to be a tax on property since the Pollock
Cases. In Knowlton v Moore,26 3 the argument that a tax on an inher-
ent right of ownership was a tax on the property was denied; and in
Billings v United States,2 1- 4 and Pierce v United States, " ,- , both de-
cided before the Dawson Case, the Court had expressly pointed out
the difference between a tax levied merely bcause one owned property
and a tax levied on the use of property The court in the Dawson Case
gave the Kentucky tax a label it had never been willing to use under
the Federal Constitution. The fact that Justice Brandeis cited two
cases decided by the Court of Mississippi in support of his proposition
that "to levy a tax by reason of ownership of property is to tax the
property" is an interesting point in this respect.2 66 One of these cases
was Thompson v McLeod, discussed at length above,20 7 where the
court found that the right to extract turpentine from standing trees
-220 U. S. 107 (1911).
'240 U. S. 1 (1916).
- 240 U. S. 103 (1916).
- 178 U. S. 608 (1902).
-232 U. S. 261 (1913).
- 232 U. S. 288, 294 (1913).
- 255 U. S. 290 (1920).
"6 See discussion at p. 395 et seq.
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was the only use to which the property could be put and that a tax on
that right was a property tax.
If it is possible to rationalize the Dawson Case with the other Su-
preme Court cases pertaining to the nature of taxes, it is on this basis:
that a tax levied on the only use to which property can be put is a tax
levied by reason of ownership and therefore a tax on the property
This is the explanation of the case implied by Mr. Justice Stone a
few years later in Bromley v McCaughn..2 68 In that case the Court
sustained a tax on gifts inter vivos as an excise. Mr. Justice Stone
rested his opinion squarely on the long line of cases m which the
Court had consistently used the excise theory to eliminate the need
for apportioning the tax. As to these cases and their relation to the
"ownership" doctrine, he said:2 69
"It is true that in each of these cases the tax was im-
posed upon the exercise of one of the numerous rights of property,
but each is clearly distinguishable from a tax which falls upon the
owner merely because he is owner regardless of the use or disposition
made of Is property."
When citing the Dawson Case he commented as follows:270
"Even if we assume that a tax levied upon all the uses
to which property may be put, or upon the exercise of a single power
indispensable to the enjoyment of all others over it, would be in
effect a tax upon property, and hence a direct tax requiring appor-
tionment, that is not the case before us."
Finally Justice Stone made a highly significant statement as to the
basis of the distinction made by the Supreme Court in all the cases
discussed:271
"The persistence of this distinction and the justification
for it rest upon the historic fact that taxes of tis type were not under-
stood to be direct taxes when the Constitution was adopted and, as
well, upon the reluctance of thins Court to enlarge by construction,
limitations upon the sovereign power of taxation by Article I, section
8, so vital to maintenance of the National Government."
It cannot be denied that the use of the "ownership" theory m the
Dawson Case enlarged by construction the limitations upon the sov-
ereign power of taxation contained in the uniformity provisions, a
power vital to the state governments. On the other hand, it is appar-
ent that courts which are reluctant to enlarge the limitation can find
ample high authority for using the label "excise" rather than the label
"property'"
-'280 U. S. 124 (1929).
'280 U. S. 124, 137 (1929).
'1Id. at 138.




As was stated at the outset in this discussion of taxes which may be
labeled property or non-property, there is no certain and final basis
for determining into which category a tax will fall in every case. In
spite of a tendency to engage exclusively in an analysis of the nature
of the tax, the courts undoubtedly realize the significance of the label-
ing technique. As Justice Stone pointed out in explaining a compar-
able situation under the Federal Constitution, a decision defining the
nature of the levy imposed by any particular tax statute is necessarily
influenced by the court's willingness or reluctance to invoke a consti-
tutional limitation on the legislature's power to tax. However, the
courts are not guided entirely by whim, and most of them follow cer-
tain influential factors regarding the nature of taxes. Although these
factors are broad and general, they are reasonably well defined and
bear repeating by way of summary
The courts apply two tests to determine in a general way whether
a tax is one levied on property or is an excise, privilege or occupation
tax. One test emphasizes the method of levying the tax and the other
stresses the object or purpose of the tax. In applying these tests the
courts hold that a tax on capital stock is a privilege or franchise tax
unless it is levied in a manner so similar to taxes on property as to
represent just another tax on corporate property If the legislature
chooses to measure the amount of the tax by a percentage of gross
receipts as a more direct indication of the amount of business done
or privilege enjoyed, the courts sustain the legislation as a privilege
or occupation tax unless the statute contains some earmark of a prop-
erty tax such as a provision making the levy in lieu of all other taxes.
The courts meet any argument that a tax measured by gross earnings
or gross receipts is really a tax on those receipts and earnings directly,
and therefore a property tax, by pointing out that the true object or
purpose of the legislation is to impose a tax on the corporate privilege
and that gross receipts are merely used to measure the tax. This ex-
planation or theory as to the nature of a gross receipts tax is not con-
trary to those Supreme Court cases which call such a tax a property
tax because the primary concern of the Court in those decisions is to
establish a distinction between taxes obviously levied on gross receipts
derived in part from interstate commerce, and taxes which are enacted
by the States in a legitimate exercise of their power to tax. In respect
to this particular problem, a state can exercise its legitimate power to
tax by imposing a tax on a business or privilege as well as by taxing
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property In either case the purpose of the tax, although measured
by receipts derived in part from interstate business, clearly is not to
burden interstate commerce. Use of the business tax theory rather
than the property tax theory will circumvent the constitutional limita-
tion of uniformity applicable to property taxation.
The courts find that a tax levied on receipts from the sale of prop-
erty is similar to other taxes measured by gross receipts and they test
and sustain the legislation imposing it in a similar way In fact, they
recognize that the privilege theory underlying the sales tax, gross re-
ceipts tax, and other business taxes makes this type of legislation one
of the best available to the legislature in its quest to reach sources of
revenue otherwise protected from taxation by the uniformity pro-
visions.
The courts sustain severance and production taxes levied on the
privilege of extracting natural resources or putting property to some
other use, and find that such taxes are non-property in character on
the theory that the legislation imposes an excise, privilege or business
tax rather than a tax on the property extracted, produced, or used, as
such. There are a good many vigorous judicial opmions to the con-
trary, however, based on the idea that a tax on the attributes of own-
ership is a tax on the property itself. Whether this "ownership" test
is of great value, or whether it will be applied by every court is
problematical. It is used in Mississippi to invalidate a tax levied on
the privilege of extracting turpentine and resin from standing trees,
but not used in those states which sustain a tax levied on virtually all
the uses to which intangible property is put because of ownership.
The doctrine was adopted, and therefore is strengthened, by the
Supreme Court in the case of Dawson v Kentucky Distilleries and
Warehouse Company. However, the Supreme Court has been un-
willing to use the "property tax" label when passing on the nature of
many taxes under the Federal Constitutional provision requiring the
apportionment of direct taxes, and its decisions afford ample authority
for sustaining many kinds of taxes as excises.
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CHAPTER VII
TAXES CLEARLY NON-PROPERTY IN NATURE
SECTION 1.
In General
Legislation imposing taxes clearly non-property in nature is char-
acterized in a broad way as excise tax legislation. Its outstanding fea-
tures, as pointed out in the analysis just made of taxes which may be
labeled property or non-property, are that it imposes a levy on pri-
vileges rather than directly against property, and that it is not subject
to the same restrictive rules of uniformity applicable to property taxa-
tion. In a sense the real reason for so designating a tax is implicit in
these two ideas for they indicate the effect of the constitutional limita-
tion requiring uniformity in taxation on this type of legislation and the
method used by the legislature to avoid this restriction. Moreover,
as was the case with taxes clearly in the nature of property taxes, the
effect of the constitutional limitation is felt at a later point in the
court's decision. That is to say- when a court rules on the constitu-
tionality of this type of legislation, its concern with the nature of the
tax is secondary to a consideration of problems of classification and
exemption. To put it in still another way, if there is a critical question
as to the nature of the tax which will permit the court's decision to go
either way, the effect of the constitutional restriction is apparent im-
mediately; but, if the nature of the tax is clear, the constitutional
provision merely serves as a basis for prescribing the limits within
which the legislature must exercise its power to classify and exempt
the subjects of taxation.
The cases involving this type of legislation present few problems
that have not been mentioned or discussed previously, but they do
place greater emphasis on questions pertaining to the legislature's
power to tax. Also, some of the cases afford a good opportunity to
understand more fully the answer to three questions which run
through all phases of this study What feature in a statute makes the
tax non-property in nature and therefore not subject to an absolute
rule of uniformity? How far may a legislature go in classifying sub-
jects in the imposition of an excise tax without violating the uniformity
provision? What are some of the questions of policy underlying the
levy of excises according to one rule of uniformity and taxes on prop-
erty according to another rule?
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SECTION 2.
The Inheritance Tax: A Typical Excise
In spite of an occasional historical contention to the contrary, an
inheritance tax is the clearest sort of excise or privilege tax in the
legal sense. This is true although property is the item of wealth in-
volved and serves as the means for measuring the tax. Whether it is
found that the subject of the tax is "the interest which ceased by reason
of death," 7 2 or the "privilege of inheriting,"2 73 or "the transmission of
property,"2 74 or the "right of succession,"275 the tax is not on property,
and that is the important thing when testing the statute for uniformity
As was stated by the Supreme Court in Knowlton v Moore, 276 an in-
heritance tax is a death duty and "predicated on the passing of prop-
erty as the result of death, as distinct from a tax on property disasso-
ciated from its transmission or receipt by will, or as the result of
intestacy "
A more elaborate statement regarding the nature of an inheritance
tax as well as the constitutional basis for the legislature's power to
impose such a tax is made by the court in In Re Morris Estate.2 7 7 After
tracing the history of death duties, the court said:2 7 8
"The fallacy in the argument of counsel for the Executors
is in assuming that the tax is a tax upon property, and therefore
should be uniform and levied in conformity with the requirements of
the Constitution. If we concede us premise, we should have no
diffeulty in amving at his conclusion. The theory on winch taxation
of this kind on the devolution of estates is based and legality upheld
is clearly established and is founded upon two principles: 1st, A suc-
cession tax is a tax on the right of succession to property, and not on
the property itself. 2nd, The right to take property by devise or
descent is not one of the natural rights of man but is a creature of
the law. Should the supreme law abolish such rights the property
would escheat to the government or fall to the first occupant. The
authority which confers such rights may impose conditions upon
them or take them away entirely. Accordingly it is held that the
States may tax the privilege, grant exemptions, discrimmate between
relatives and between these and strangers, and are not precluded
from the exercise of this power by constitutional provisions requiring
uniformity and equality of taxation. Neither is it necessary to the
validity of the tax that the State Constitution should contain a speci-
fic delegation of power authorizing the Legislature to impose such
--'Knowlton.v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 49 (1899).
'State v. Hogg. 123 Tex. 568, 72 S. W 2d 593 (1934).
'In Re McKennon's Estate, 25 S. D. 369, 126 N. NV 611 (1910).
'- Dixon v. Ricketts, 26 Utah 215, 72 Pac. 947 (1903).
a' Knowlton v. Moore. supra note 272, p. 125, at 47.
138 N. C. 259, 50 S. E. 682 (1905).
Id. at 262, 50 S. E. at 683.
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taxation. The power of the Legislature over the subject of taxation
is absolute unless restricted by the Constitution of the State or Nation.
Upon the grounds we have stated inheritance or succession tax laws
have been uniformly held to be valid and to infringe no constitutional
provisions, Federal or State."
From the clear assertions made here, it is possible to formulate a par-
tial answer to the questions posed above. Whether it is the only
answer remains to be seen. Under the doctrine of the Morris Case,
if the statute clearly shows that the tax is imposed on a right which
is a "creature of the law", it is not a tax on the propeity Similarly,
the same authority which creates that right or privilege can tax it.
Since the legislature has the power to tax, it can grant exemptions or
"discriminate," and is not "precluded from the exercise of this power
by constitutional provisions requiring uniformity and equality of taxa-
tion." In other words, if the state can grant a right or privilege, it not
only can tax the privilege, but, as a matter of basic constitutional
interpretation and policy, it can exercise that power to grant exemp-
tions and to discriminate without violating the constitutional provision
for uniformity The implications of this doctrine are worthy of the
closest attention.
It is indeed misleading to conclude that a legislature's power to
impose this type of legislation is entirely unlimited in every case.
Although the broad statement in the Morris Case that succession tax
laws m no way infringe upon the constitutional provisions of the Fed-
eral or State Constitutions probably is true when applied to the
general principles underlying the nature of the tax, it is not entirely
accurate in describing the effect of some uniformity provisions on the
legislature's power to discriminate. In this respect it is clear that the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution is not a major barrier to a reasonable exercise of the state
legislature's power to classify, but, m a few instances at least, certain
provisions in an inheritance tax statute may violate the uniformity
provision of the state constitution. An interesting example of this
kind of situation arises when the legislation includes a progressive rate
feature. The solution of the problem presented by such a feature is
complicated to some extent by the decisions of the Supreme Court
on the point.
The doctrine and language used in the Morris Case appeared im-
tially in Mr. Justice McKenna's opinion in Magoun v Illinois Trust and
Savings Bank,2 79 where the Supreme Court upheld a comparatively
early inheritance tax statute enacted in Illinois. In this case the Court
- 170 U. S. 283 (1897).
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found that an inheritance tax statute which established classes on the
basis of remoteness of relationship to the decedent, and provided rates
graduated according to the value of the inheritance did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In addition
the Court found that a statutory scheme for the progression of rates
did not violate the equal protection clause. On this critical point the
Court said:2 8 0
"It is said that the tax is not in proportion to the amount
but vanes with the amounts arbitrarily made, and hence that an in-
heritance of $10,000 or less pays 3 per cent, and that one over $10,000
pays not 3 per cent on 10,000 and an increased percentage on the
excess over $10,000 but an increased percentage on the $10,000 as
well as on the excess, and it is said, as we have seen, that in conse-
quence one who is given a legacy of ten thousand and one dollars
by the deduction of the tax receives $99.04 less than one who is
given a legacy of $10,000. But neither case can be said to be con-
trary to the rule of equality of the Fourteenth Amendment."
On the question of whether this progression feature violated the uni-
formitv provision of the Illinois Constitution the Court adopted the
finding of the Illinois court that it did not. The Court did not actually
examine the question exhaustively.for itself.
After the Magoun Case was decided the courts in a number of
states upheld similar provisions in inheritance tax statutes by simply
repeating the reasons given by the Supreme Court in this decision
which were paraphrased in the Morris Case-s2 opinion quoted above.
Not too long after the Magoun Case was decided the Supreme Court
undermined that decision somewhat by intimating in Knowlton v
Moore,"'s' that the fact the state has the right to control the trans-
mission of property by devise or succession has nothing to do with the
power of the state to tax transmission of the property any more than
the power to create corporations, and to give them the right to do busi-
ness, would empower a state to disregard its Constitution in taxing
such business. Furthermore, the language of the court in the Knowl-
ton Case, where the question of the effect of the uniformity clause in
the Federal Constitution was raised, left the impression that the fed-
eral inheritance tax statute, which included a progressively graduated
rate feature similar to the statutes enacted in a number of states,
would violate the requirements of uniformity under the state con-
stitutions.
-'.'Id. at 300.
"' See for inslance: Re Manes Estate, 32 Colo. 527, 77 Pac. 853, (1904); Appeal
of Nettleton, 76 Conn. 235, 56 At. 565 (1903): In re Foxes Estate, 154 Mich. 5, 117
N. IV 558, (1908); State ex rel Taylor v. Guilbert, 70 Ohio St. 229, 71, N. E. 636
(1901)- Humemacker v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N. NV 627 (1906).
- 174 U. S. 41 (1902).
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This combination of factors opened the way for considerable con-
troversy in the state courts as to the effect of the uniformity provisions
on the legislature's power to classify and discriminate in levying an
inheritance tax. The particular problem of progressive rates was
further complicated by the fact that it could not be solved merely by
determining the nature of the tax. Even if the legislature was con-
ceded broad powers to classify, the imposition of a progressive rate
might exceed its power as limited by the uniformity provision. Under
those circumstances the court in In Re McKennan's Estate,"28 3 examined
in some detail the constitutionality of a progressively graduated inheri-
tance tax statute from the standpoint of uniformity in taxation as re-
quired by South Dakota's Constitution.
The uniformity requirement in that constitution appeared in the
so-called Bill of Rights section, and again in the revenue section where
its application clearly was limited to taxes on property The "Bill of
Rights Clause" provided: "No tax or duty shall be imposed without
the consent of the people or their representatives in the Legislature,
and all taxation shall be equal and uniformY."2 4 After careful study
the court found that this provision did not prevent the legislature from
providing for classification and progression if the classification and
progression were based on a proper foundation and resulted in sub-
stantial uniformity and equality In fact, the court pointed out that
in the case of inheritance taxes there could be equality only where
there was classification and asserted that such classification must be
based "on some reasonable ground-some difference which bears a
just and proper relation to the attempted classification." In this re-
gard the court construed the constitutional provision so that it was
no more restrictive than the ordinary provision requiring uniformity
within the class.
Nevertheless, in spite of the liberal interpretation given the "out of
place" uniformity clause, the court found that enactment of the pro-
gressive inheritance tax statute exceeded the legislature's power to
"discriminate." In so finding the court not only prescribed limits for
the legislative power, but also cast some light on the questions of
policy involved in reconciling the legislature's power to impose a tax
clearly non-property in nature with a liberal constitutional standard
for uniformity
To begin with the court found that the clause requiring all taxation
to be equal and uniform meant that the tax burden imposed should
2- 25 S. D. 369, 126 N. W 611 (1910).
'-%Id. at 383, 126 N. W. at 616.
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fall alike on all persons in substantially the same situation, and that
within the boundary of this limitation were broad fields of legislative
discretion which should not be invaded by the courts. Further, the
court thought that it was clearly a greater privilege for a person hav-
ing no natural claims upon the deceased to inherit his property, be-
cause during the life of the deceased his family might have helped
acquire the property and undoubtedly would have been legally re-
quired to support him. Too, the court had no trouble finding that
because of the public policy against allowing large fortunes to be held
together by an undivided transmission upon the death of the owner,
it was a greater privilege or right to take a large inheritance than a
small one. The court was willing to extend this idea to include the
additional premise that the privilege or right to take could be greater
not only in proportion to the value of the inheritance, but also out of
proportion to such value. Thus it could be said that it was a greater
privilege to take the second $10,000 of an estate than the first $10,000.
To this point the court found no conflict between the policies un-
derIving the taxation of the privilege and those represented in the
concept of uniformity However, when a comparison in methods of
progression was made, the conflict was found and a line was drawn.
The court pointed out that there were two possible methods of letting
the rate progress from transmissions of less value to those of greater
value. In the first, the higher rate, in case of transmission of a greater
devise or bequest, was levied on the whole value of property trans-
mitted. This was the method adopted in the instant statute. In the
second, the increased rate applied only to the excess, in value of prop-
erty transmitted, over the amount subject to the next lower rate. This
was the method adopted by statutes in other states.285  The first
method was rejected on the ground that it created inequality in taxa-
tion. Although the court became involved in some rather tortuous
mathematical demonstrations to prove its point, two general reasons
were set forth for rejecting the first method progression. First, it was
found that under that method the recipient of a larger amount of
inheritance was less able to pay a larger rate of tax than the recipient
of a smaller amount. This was considered a clear violation of uni-
formity although the Supreme Court in the Magoun Case expressly
stated that such a result was not unequal under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Consituton.2 8 6 Secondly, although the court ad-
mitted that the legislature could place a limit in value above which
all transmissions would go to the state, it found that there must always
I- -d. at 386, 126 N. IV at 618.
See discussion p. 408 et seq,
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be an increase in net benefit whenever there is a greater transmission
if a progressive tax rate imposed on that benefit or privilege is to be
uniform. Thus the court in In Re McKennan's Estate drew a nice and
precise conceptual line beyond which the legislature could not go.
SECTION 3.
Implications in In Re McKennan's Estate
What is the value of the McKennan Case? Did the court really
succeed in laying down an effective guide for levying an inheritance
tax so the burdens of taxation would be uniformly borne by taxpayers
similarly situated? Are there any tangible principles in the case on
which to predicate helpful and realistic concepts for judging other
types of taxes that are clearly non-property in character? It is sug-
gested that tis case, in spite of the pains taken by the court to pro-
duce an exact and final test for the meaning of uniformity under the
circumstances, contributes very little to the quest for certainty m this
type of problem. At most it merely demonstrates how a uniformity
provision, even when liberally construed, can be used to declare un-
constitutional a tax statute which includes a provision the court con-
siders unfair.
On the other hand, the courts must invade the broad field of legis-
lative discretion at some point to restrict that discretion in light of the
relevant constitutional language. The point is that the concept of
uniformity is little more than the nearest available weapon when such
an invasion is made. The McKennan Case is as good a case as one
will find to illustrate that most legal problems of uniformity in taxation
are really a contest between the legislature in its exercise of a broad
power to tax and the courts in their exercise of an equally effective
power to interpret constitutional limitations on that power. Theoreti-
cally at least the taxpayer is entitled to have his share of the burdens of
taxation determined by this contest. Whether that burden is really
uniform and equal or not depends on many things besides the re-
stricted issues involved in the constitutional controversy To this
extent the uniformity provisions cloud the issue and serve little prac-
tical purpose or function.
A tendency to complicate unnecessarily the problem of uniformity
is another weakness in some of the earlier cases like the Morris Case
and McKennan Case. Probably because the requirement for uniform-
ity is a constitutional requirement, the courts in these cases seem to
go out of their way to rationalize the tax statute with their notion of
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uniformity by engaging in lengthy and involved examinations of the
nature of the tax, theories underlying its imposition, and the way it is
levied. As a result, the importance of the uniformity provisions is
overemphasized because there is no reason to believe these provisions
were written into the constitutions for the purpose of subjecting the
taxing power to broad and general limitations. When a court attempts
to establish a distinctive doctrine as to the nature and theory of an
inheritance tax, as was done in the Mors Case, or to draw fine lines
of distinction between two methods of imposing a progressive rate, as
was done in the McKennan Case, it may lose sight of the fact that
constitutional provisions should not be construed so as to limit unduly
the legislative power to raise revenue. It is impossible to find an
exact and precise meaning for the concept of uniformity even when it
is expressed in the constitution, and the constitutional language estab-
lishing such an elusive idea in the fundamental law should be con-
strued so as to allow the state to exercise the power it clearly has. Such
a result certainly is possible in the case of inheritance tax statutes with-
out the courts becoming too concerned with peculiar theories of justi-
fication, and without distorting constitutional language.
To put the proposition in terms of an answer to the questions raised
at the beginning of this phase of the discussion, all the courts need to
find is that the tax is not a property tax. There is no reason for ex-
ploring the intricate nature of various kinds of taxes, or for questioning
the authority or power to levy the particular tax because admittedly
the legislature has full power in matters of taxation. This power stems
from a logical division of the attributes of sovereignty among the three
branches of government and is not dependent on express constitu-
tional mandate although it may be stated there. By characterizing
the tax as clearly non-property in nature, the court not only limits the
effect of constitutional provisions applicable only to property taxes,
but it eliminates all problems of authority and power except those
having to do with restrictions imposed by the particular constitutional
language on the State's general power to tax. When it has done this
the court is free to consider directly the problem of how far the legis-
lature may go in its proper exercise of the State's sovereign right to tax.
In other words, the court narrows the judicial problem to a determina-
tion of the extent to which the legislature, under the constitution, can
discriminate between persons and subjects in imposing a tax that is
clearly non-property in nature.
In the absence of an unusual constitutional provisioin, there is little
to be gained by construing a requirement for uniformity as more
restrictive in this respect than provisions for equal protection of the
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laws. Although express constitutional language may require a differ-
ent rule of uniformity for property taxes, there is notung so oppres-
sive about the power to levy excise taxes as to create a need for limita-
tions on its exercise over and above those limitations imposed on all
legislative power by the equal protection clauses of the Federal and
State Constitutions. As a matter of fact, modern economic conditions
often make it necessary to exercise the power to tax in a comparatively
unlimited fashion if the state governments are to achieve the full poten-
tialities of their other sovereign powers.
The somewhat simpler approach to the constitutional status of in-
heritance tax statutes outlined above is followed in a number of juris-
dictions. Thus it is held that a collateral inheritance tax is simply an
excise tax uniform in rate as to the whole class of collaterals and
strangers, which satisfies the requirement of uniformity 2 8 7  And,
since an inheritance tax is not a property tax, the statute imposing it
may provide for classification and graduation. 8 8  Similarly, the fact
that the amount of an inheritance tax depends on the ,alue of the
property transmitted does not make it invalid since "it is usual and
proper to proportion the amount of an excise to the value of the pri-
vilege taxed,"2 9 and an inheritance tax is valid because "it is an excise
and not within the uniformity clause."2 90 Even if a classified and
graduated inheritance tax is subjected to the rule of uniformity con-
tained in the constitution, it is still constitutional, because "that clause
does not limit the power of the legislature in levying excises and in-
heritance taxes beyond those limitations contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution."2 91
SECTION 4.
Other Excie Taxes
The general theories used by the courts m the line of cases just
mentioned are carried over and applied to legislation imposing many
other kinds of taxes which are clearly non-property m nature. The
increasing importance of license taxes, business taxes, gasoline taxes,
automobile registration taxes, and many other types of excises in state
systems of taxation m recent years is attributable in no small part to
a willingness of the courts to find that the legislature's power to im-
pose such taxes is not unduly limited by the constitutional provisions
281 State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495, 30 At. 76 (1894).
BIn re Foxes Estate, 154 Mich. 5, 117 N. V 558 (1908).
Kingsbury v. Chapin, 196 Mass. 533, 82 N. E. 700 (1907).
State v. Cline, 91 Kan. 416, 137 Pac. 932 (1914); McCannon v. State, 33 Okla.
145, 125 Pac. 1063 (1912); State v. Hogg, 123 Tex. 568, 72 S. AV 2d 593 (1934); Dixon
v. Ricketts, 26 Utah 215, 72 Pac. 947 (1903).
"I In re Estate of Heck, 120 Ore. 80, 250 Pac. 735 (1926).
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requiring uniformity in taxation. As long as the courts were unwilling
to abandon the practice of using rigid conceptualistic tests in inter-
preting these provisions, and questioned closely the nature of the tax
in this type of legislation, a highly productive source of revenue was
denied to the state governments.
Of the many kinds of excises imposed in the various states, license
taxes are the least likely to be declared unconstitutional by the courts.
Even historically this type of levy was recognized by the courts as a
tax that was not subject to the constitutional restrictions applicable to
property taxes. '9- It was on this ground that drummer's license
fees, ' 1 license taxes on auctioneers,"2 94 license fees on the canning of
oysters,""- -, city license taxes on merchants,'2 9 6 and many other similar
exactions were first upheld although numerous exemptions and classi-
fications were made by the legislature in imposing them. For example,
a tax on peddlers graduated by the manner in which they traveled,
whether on foot or in one or two horse wagons, was not considered a
tax on the goods sold and therefore within the purview of the consti-
tutional provisions requiring the taxation of property according to
value.t97 In the same way a license tax graduated according to the
value of the marketable product,2 98 or the value of retail stock,299 or
the number of cows a dairyman kept,300 was not held invalid for lack
of uniformity More recently the number of examples of valid license
tax statutes one can find in the state reports is practically endless.
Differing from the pure license taxes only in the descriptive wording
used in the statutes are many business and occupation taxes, some of
which were discussed in detail above, and they are widely sustained
also. For instance, an annual tax of an arbitrary amount levied on
every person selling liquor either at wholesale or retail is not an
unequal tax on property,;" " and a tax on lewd houses does not offend
the uniformity clause due to the classification made because it is a
tax on a businessa0' '
- In re Drew v. Tifft, 79 Minn. 175, 81 N. IV 839 (1900); State ex rel Garth v.
Sitzler, 143 Mo. 287, 45 S. W 245 (1898); Opinion of the Justices, 81 N. H. 552, 120
At. 629 (1923); Copes Estate, 191 Pa. 1, 43 Atl. 79 (1899).
' Ex Parle Robinson, 12 Nev. 263 (1877).
Witnz v. Girardey, 31 La. Ann. 381 (1879).
State v. Applegarth, 81 Md. 293, 31 At. 961 (1895).
Re Martin, 62 Kan. 638, 64 Pac. 43 (1901).
Re Watson, 17 S. D. 486, 97 N. W 463 (1903).
- Strater Brothers Tobacco Company v. Commonwealth, 117 Ky. 604, 78 S. W.
871 (1904).
-' Salt Lake City v. Christensen Company, 34 Utah 38, 95 Pac. 523 (1908).
"'Birmingham v. Goldstein, 151 Ala. 473, 44 So. 113 (1907).
3 1Straub v. Gordon, 27 Ark. 625 (1872); Parson v. People, 32 Colo. 221, 76 Pac.
666 (1904); Burch v. Savanah, 42 Ga. 596 (1871); State Tax Commission v. Hughes
Drug Company 219 Ky. 432, 293 S. W%. 944 (1927); Adler v. 'Whitbeck, 44 Ohio St.
539, 9 N. E. 673 (1886).
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Some comparatively recent cases which follow closely the historical
position of the courts as to the constitutionality of license and business
taxes illustrate rather clearly the effect of the uniformity provisions on
this type of tax legislation. In Virginia, for example, a city license tax
on each gasoline pump is constitutional on the theory that there is
nothing in the constitution to prevent the legislature from classifying
filling station operators in imposing a license tax."0 3 In Arizona the
court takes the position that "even though the license fee be treated
as a tax and not a police regulation, it is an excise and not a property
tax, and under the authorities the rule that all taxes upon the same
class of property shall be uniform does not apply" 30 4  In Mississippi
the courts find that a manufacturers or producers tax levied at the
rate of one percent on the value of the manufactured products is an
excise and not a property tax controlled by the constitutional pro-
visions that taxation shall be uniform and equal throughout the state,
and that property shall be taxed in proportion to value.30 And in
Alabama the court goes so far as to hold that a license tax on radio
dealers graduated according to the size of the city in which the dealer
does business is constitutional although the dealers in the cities be-
tween 10,000 and 15,000 population are omitted entirely '1 , In this
case the position was taken that the license fee was uniform as to all
dealers in a city of a given size and that there was no imperative re-
quirement of the constitution that taxes, other than taxes on property,
should be uniform or equal provided they are imposed uniformly and
equally on all dealers doing business in the designated locality Such
an interpretation strips the uniformity provision of all its restrictive
effect except for a sort of geographical equality
Another doctrine or theory used by the courts to sustain tax legis-
lation on the ground that it is clearly non-property in nature is that
the thing taxed is the use to which the property is put rather than the
property itself. There is little to choose between a privilege theory
and a use theory except that one or the other may reflect more ac-
curately the actual intention of the legislature as indicated by the
wording of the particular statute. Both theories are part of the same
idea that an excise tax is not intended to reach the res or thing which
constitutes property, but that the true subject of the tax is some act
on the part of the owner of the property That act may consist of
312 Williams v. State, 150 Ga. 480, 104 S. E. 408 (1920).
303 McKenney v. Alexandria, 147 Va. 157, 136 S. E. 588 (1927).
Morris v. State, 40 Ariz. 32, 9 P 2d 404 (1932).
' Southern Package Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 174 Miss. 212, 164
So. 45 (1935).
Henry v. Shevinsky, 239 Ala. 293, 195 So. 222 (1910); See also Virginia v.
Whiting Oil Company, 167 Va. 73, 187 S. E. 498 (1936).
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exercising a privilege or it may consist of using property in a par-
ticular way In either case, the act, or succession of acts, is the thing
taxed, and such a tax is not a property tax.
Because of the argument that a tax on the use of property amounts
to a tax on the property itself, the courts often consider it necessary
to find that the use taxed is a general or impersonal use. That is, that
an excise is a tax on the general use of some facility maintained by the
state rather than a tax on a particular use of particular property owned
by the taxpayer. Under this kind of rationalization, the idea of pri-
vilege and the idea of use are virtually one and the same. This is the
variation of the use theory usually found in the cases where the courts
sustain taxes on gasoline and automobiles as taxes clearly non-property
in nature.
Normally the courts hold that a tax upon the use of gasoline, or
upon a specific use of gasoline such as its use in propelling motor ve-
hicles on the public roads, is an excise, and the legislature in imposing
such a tax may classify persons as well as property and established
graduated or arbitrary rates.307 It is of little legal significance that the
gasoline itself is used to measure the amount of the tax, usually at a
certain number of cents per gallon. In Altitude Oil Company v
People,""" for instance, the court held that a tax of an arbitrary amount
per gallon on petroleum products "offered for sale or use or consump-
tion for power purposes in propelling motor vehicles" was an excise.
The tax, in the opinion of the court, is not levied on the petroleum
products as such, but merely upon that part of the property which is
devoted to the purpose named in the statute, and therefore it is no
violation of uniformity to measure the amount of tax by the quantity
of property sold rather than by the value of the property
In Standard Oil Company v Brodie,"0  the court shows the rela-
tion of the use concept to the traditional privilege theory, and points
out why a gasoline excise logically is not a tax on the gasoline as
property The Arkansas statute provided that all persons "who sell
gasoline, kerosene, or other products to be used by the purchaser
thereof in propelling motor vehicles over the highways of the
-.7 Bowman v. Continental Oil Company, 256 U. S. 642 (1920); Trinity Farm
Construction Company v. Grossjean, 291 U. S. 466 (1934); Sparling v. Refunding
Board, 189 Ark. 189, 71 S. V 2(d 182 (1934); Standard Oil Company v. Brodie, 153
Ark. 114, 239 S. W 753 (1922); Altitude Oil Company v. People, 70 Colo. 452, 202
Pac. 180 (1921); Garfil v. Bracken, 195 Ind. 551, 45 N. E. 312 (1924); Metropolitan
Ferry Company v. Commonwealth, 225 Ky. 45, 7 S. W 2d 506 (1928); Burke v. Bass,
123 Neb. 297 242 N. W. 796 (1932); George E. Breece Lumber Company v. Mirabel,
3-1 N. M. 643, 287 Pac. 699 (1930); O'Berry v. Mecklenburg County, 198 N. C. 357
151 S. E. 580 (1930); State v. Sioux Falls, 60 N. D. 330, 244 N. W 365 (1932).
-"'70 Colo. 452, 202 Pac. 180 (1921).
153 Ark. 114, 239 S. W 753 (1922).
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state" should collect from the purchaser an arbitrary sum on each
gallon sold. In discussing the subject of the tax the court said:-"'
"It is easy to discover in the language (of the statute)
an intention on the part of the lawmakers to impose a tax not on
property, but on a privilege, so as to bring the enactment within
constitutional limits. The tax is not imposed on the sale or purchase
of gasoline, nor on the gasoline itself, nor even on the use of the
gasoline. On the contrary, the final and essential element in the
imposition of the tax is that the gasoline purchased must be used in
propelling a certain and of vehicle over the public highways. In
the final analysis of this language it comes down to the point that
the thing which is really taxed is the use of the vehicle of the char-
acter described upon the public highway, and the extent of the use
is measured by the quantity of fuel consumed, and the tax is im-
posed according to the extent of the use as thus measured. If it had
been intended merely to tax the gasoline or its use, it whould have
been wholly unnecessary to describe the character of the use or the
place where it was to be used; and the fact that the lawmakers in-
corporated these elements in laying the basis of the taxation shows
uimistakenly that it was intended to impose a tax upon the use of
the public highways by the method described. It is clear that the
tax is not mposed on the seller, nor upon. the gasoline while m his
hands and this of itself makes it manifest that there was no inten-
tion to levy a tax upon the sale of gasoline or upon the gasoline itself."
It is apparent from the logic of the Brodie Case that the critical
question in the use theory is whether the tax is imposed on the right
"use" Under the Supreme Court's doctrine in Dawson v Kentucky
Distilleries and Warehouse Company, discussed above,31i that a tax
on the only use to which property can be put is a tax on the property,
a court must be careful to find that the tax is not levied on an exclusive
or "only use" In the Brodie Case the court did this by asserting that
the real subject of the tax was the use of the vehicle rather than the
use of the gasoline. In Garfil v Bracken,-*-' the court takes a more
tenable position by pointing out that the gasoline can be used in a
number of ways other than the particular use which the statute makes
the subject of the tax. In this case the court based its decision mainly
on the fact that the owner of the gasoline could continue to own it
indefinitely without becoming liable for the tax, or use it in a manner
other than that mentioned in the statute. There are other ways of
avoiding the implications of the Dawson Case doctrine. The courts in
Alabama and Florida have used a combination of the privilege theory,
the use theory, and a'police power theory" with interesting results.
In Alabama the legislature enacted a statute which nposed an
arbitrary tax of a certain sum per gallon on every distributor, retailer,
3o1 Ibid.
St255 U. S. 288 (1921) cited and discussed p. 398, et seq.
195 Ind. 551, 145 N. E. 312 (1924).
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and storer of gasoline in the state. A "storer" was defined as any per-
son who shipped the commodity into the state in tank car quantities,
stored it, or withdrew it from storage for any purpose. The last fea-
ture differed very little from the tax imposed m the Dawsdn Case on
whiskey removed from bond, but the tax was sustained as an excise in
State v Montgomery,313 where the court made the following dis-
tinction:
"There is a clear distinction between (1) an excise tax
upon the business, occupation or privilege of owning, storing and
withdrawing gasoline, imposed not only for revenue, but also because
it is a dangerous explosive, and within the police power of the state,
and (2) a tax upon the separate acts of the owner in talang his prop-
erty out of storage for his own use; for this is a property tax."
This idea that an excise on the storage of gasoline is imposed as a
regulatory measure under the police power as well as for the purpose
of raising revenue was adopted by the Florida court in Jerome H. Sheip
Company v Amos,31 4 where a tax similar to the one imposed by the
Alabama statute also was sustained. In addition the court in this case
made a rather thorough study of the statute from the standpoint of
sustaining the tax on a use theory Speaking generally on the point
the court said:3 i 5
"The tax under consideration is not an excise upon the
mere right to acquire and possess property. Nor is it an excise
upon the only use to which gasoline may be put, nor upon a power
indispensable to use or enjoyment, for gasoline is in common use
,without being stored. Even if the possession of gasoline be regarded
as an inherent or natural right, the storage of such a commodity is
certainly not such a right as is immune from regulation. There is
no inherent right to use dangerous property without restraint.
The state has the power to regulate that species of use of it, as well
as the sale of it, by the i'mposition of an excise either in the exercise
of the police power, the taxing power or both.
"Since property is the sum of all the rights and powers
incident to ownership, the imposition of excises upon those powers
might conceivably be earned to the point where it would amount to
a direct property tax, abnormal difference in degree ultimately re-
suiting in a distinction in kind. But this tax is upon only a
single one of those rights, the right to store the property. All other
rights, wich collectively constitute ownership, may be enjoyed free of
tax. The tax is therefore well within the category of an indirect tax
upon use.
In this part of its decision the Florida court was merely asserting a
well-established doctrine for the Supreme Court had held a number
of years before that an excise upon the use of gasoline by sale, con-
sumption or storage was not a property tax.316 There still was the
'228 Ala. 93, 151 So. 856 (1933).
' 100 Fla. 863, 130 So. 699 (1930).
11-Id. at 878, 130 So. at 705.
" Bowman v. Continental Oil Company, 256 U. S. 642 (1920).
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Dawson Case to distinguish, however, because of the similarity be-
tween stonng gasoline and removing whiskey from bond. In this re-
spect the court said:3 17
"The essential difference between the Kentucky tax and
the tax now under consideration is that the present act of storing
the commodity, which is a species of 'use, and not its future with-
drawal, which is merely a change in the form of possession, not
amounting to a taxable use, is made the criterion of our tax."
It is rather difficult to rationalize this interpretation with Justice
Brandeis' explicit statement m the Dawson Case that the removal from
bond was the only use to which the whiskey could be put.a18 What
the Florida court probably meant was that there are "uses" which are
the legitimate subject of an excise tax, and there are "uses" which are
not. The problem for the legislature is to know What is a taxable
.use", and therein lies the weakness of the use theory A theory
which depends on such an unusual play on words for its validity tends
to complicate the legislature's problem rather than to simplify it.
In addition to illustrating some of the complications of the use
theory, the opinion in the Sheip Case contains a clear statement re-
garding constitutional limitations on the power of the legislature to
impose excise taxes where the constitutional provision for uniformity
is given a limited effect. On this point the court said: 'i
"In the direct imposition of a State excise upon taxable
privileges, the legislature exercises a power of extensive scope. Organic
requirements as to uniformity and valuation applicable to ad valorem
taxes, do not apply to excises, since the latter are not regarded as a
'tax within the meaning of constitutional limitations requiring uni-
formity of rates and just valuations. In the imposition of excises the
only organic limitations upon the state are that due process, equal
protection and contract rights shall not be burdened nor Federal
functions interfered with. Therefore there must be a reasonable
basis of classification, and there must be geographic, as distinguished
from intrinsic, uniformity."
Encouraged by a liberal attitude on the part of the courts toward
constitutional restrictions on the imposition of excises, as evidenced
by the language of the Sheip Case, the state legislatures have enacted
statutes levying exactions on many kinds of privileges. They seem to
realize that the privilege theory is the safest basis for sustaining a tax
as clearly non-property in nature. It is on this ground that automobile
license taxes are held constitutional as a tax levied on the privilege of
1 100 Fla. 863, 870, 130 So. 699, 702 (1930).
1' See discussion p. 399 et seq.
"1 100 Fla. 863, 879, 130 So. 699, 706 (1930).
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using the public highways, '3 20 and mortgage or stock registrations fees
are sustained as levied on the privilege of recording. 32'1 A mere listing
of some of the more interesting excises that have been -sustained gives
ample evidence of the broad powers the legislature has in this respect
once the effect of the constitutional requirement for uniformity is
limited by the courts. For instance, in Georgia a tax on automobile
dealers graduated according to the population of the county and levied
without regard for the horsepower of the automobile, profit made by
the dealer or any other fact bearing a relation to the business in
valid.32 2 In Idaho a tax on the gross earnings of a public motor car-
riers classified by the capacity of the vehicles operated is a valid excise
imposed on the privilege of using the highways. 323 In Washington a
tax on the privilege of using within the' state any article of tangible
personal property purchased after a certain date is not invalid for
want of uniformity 324 In Georgia the court has sustained a tax on
cigarettes for personal use measured by the number of cigarettes, on
the ground that the tax is an excise on the provolege of possessing
cigarettes and not a tax on property 325
The really remarkable thing about the privilege idea is that it opens
the way for almost unlimited selection of subjects of taxation by the
legislature. In finding that an annual tax on traveling stores did not
contravene the uniformity provision, the Tennessee court emphasized
this point by saying:"2 6
"The pover of the legislature to declare and tax pn-
vileges is unlimited. Its discretion in this respect cannot be restrained
or controlled by the courts."
Some courts, however, do not subscribe fully to this unequivocable
statement for they are able to restrain the legislative power to some
extent by defining the conditions under which a privilege may be taxed.
In Fort Smith v Scruggs,: 27 the court points out the real reason for
taxing the privilege of using the highways, and implies that a privilege
:-'Wiseman v. Madison Cadilac Company, 191 Ark. 1021, 88 S. IV 2d 1007
(1936); Opinon of (he Justices. 250 Mass. 591, 148 N. E. 880 (1925); Bevard v.
laughman. 167 Md. 55, 173 Atil. 10 (1934): State %. Lawrence, 108 Miss. 291, 66 So.
715 (1914); Lillard v. Melton, 103 S. C. 10.87 S. E. 121 (1915); Re Hoffert, 34 N. D.
271. 118 N. W 20 (1914); State v. Mirabel, 33 N. M. 553, 273 Pac. 928 (1928); Ex
Pare Shaw. 53 Okla. 654, 157 Pac. 900 (1916); Portland Van and Storage Company
v. Hosse, 139 Ore. 431, 9 P 2d 122 (1932).
:11 Lee v. State Tax Commission, 219 Ala. 513, 123 So. 6 (1929); Union Trust
Company %'. Common Council of Detroit, 170 Mich. 692, 137 N. W 122 (1912);
Insurance Corporation v. Hogton, 53 Okla. 530, 157 Pac. 293 (1915); Pocahontas
Colleries Company v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. 108, 73 S. E. 446 (1912).
:'-'Adains Motor Company v. Cler, 149 Ga. 818, 142 S. E. 440 (1919).
-"Smallwood v. Jeter, 32 Idaho 169, 244 Pac. 149 (1926).
Vancouver Oil Company v. Henneford, 184 Wash. 9, 49 P 2d 914 (1935).
Head v. Cigarette Sales Company, 188 Ga. 452, 4 S. E. 2d 203 (1930).
Hill v. Wumce, 149 Tenn. 168, 258 S. W 407 (1923).
'-¢70 Ark. 549, 69 S. W 679 (1902).
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must meet certain specifications before it can be taxed. The court
said: 328
"Counsel says that a tax on the use of an article is a tax
on the article itself. While this may be true of a piano, bedstead or
cooking stove, the use of which involves no injury or detriment to
the public, it is different as to wheeled vehicles for they are made
to be used upon roads and streets. The chief necessity for
keeping improved streets is that they may be used for the passage of
wheeled vehicles and the wear of the streets is caused by the passage
of such vehicles over them making necessary constant and expensive
repairs. For this reason, no doubt, the legislature considered it
equitable and just that the owners of such vehicles should in addition
to the general tax upon their property, pay something for the pn-
vilege of using the streets as driveways, the amount paid to go towards
keeping the streets in good repair."
In Saviers v Smith,329 the court holds that earmarking of the revenue
for highway maintenance is essential to the validity of the statute on
the theory that such a provision indicates the tax is imposed in rela-
ton to the value of the privilege. Such a theory of relation to value
amounts to a sort of judicial limitation on excise taxes comparable to
the constitutional limitation imposed on property taxes.
SECTION 5.
Summary
From the foregoing analysis it is reasonable to conclude that the
ordinary provision in a state constitution requiring uniformity in taxa-
tion is not a major obstacle to the legislature in imposing taxes clearly
non-property in nature. If the statute levying such a tax indicates by
its provisions that the subject of the tax is a privilege or a taxable use,
there is sufficient basis for a judicial finding that the tax is not a prop-
erty tax. If the tax is not a property tax, the legislature has unlimited
power to classify At least there are no obvious reasons for subjecting
the legislative power in this regard to a greater restraint than that
imposed on legislative power generally by constitutional provisions
requiring equal protection of the laws. As for the policy underlying
this interpretation which results in the levy of property taxes accord-
ing to one rule of uniformity and taxes clearly non-property in nature
according to another, the answer is quite simple. The state's sovereign
power to tax is, and should be, unrestricted except where the constitu-
tion specifically limits that power. There is no counteracting policy,
either legal or economic, which demands that the constitutional limi--
tation of uniformity should be extended to cover all forms of taxation
generally
-2 Ibid.
'1 101 Ohio St. 132, 128 N. E. 88 (1920).
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